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On the Pulse of America: The Federal Government's Assertion
of Jurisdiction over Electric Transmission Planning and Its
Effect on the Public Interest*
"It is declaredthat the business of transmittingand selling electric
energy for ultimate distributionto the public is affected with a
public interest ... ."
-16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006)
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INTRODUCTION

Electricity is essential for our modern life, but paying a monthly
electric utility bill significantly affects the financial situation of a great
many Americans, from lower-income families to mighty industries.
America's electricity grid-that network of towering transmission
lines, transformers, and telephone-pole distribution that delivers
electricity on demand to consumers nationwide-is an awe-inspiring
machine that requires significant investments in modernization to
ensure system reliability for residents, businesses, and critical medical
and communications infrastructure.'
Given the potential for substantial benefits and costs for
American communities and industry, it is essential to carry out this
investing equitably and efficiently. Planning how to invest, however,
is fraught with controversy. That controversy is especially present in
deciding whether to build additional transmission lines or make nontransmission investments such as more local "distributed" electric
generation. The controversy in planning is amplified by a controversy
over how to pay for whichever investment choice is made.
Proponents of constructing additional transmission, including
some utility companies, federal policymakers, consumer groups, and
many renewable energy advocates, contend that transmission can
help ensure the long-term reliability of the grid.' Transmission can
1. See generally Ashley Halsey III, Decrepit U.S. Power Grid Starts to Sputter, WASH.
POsT, Aug. 2, 2012, at Al (suggesting that the power grid is fragile enough that an
overhaul is imminently necessary). The electric power supply chain from manufacturing to
consumption can be separated into three parts. See LORRIN PHILIPSON & H. LEE
WILLIS, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND DE-REGULATION 3 (2d ed.

2006). "Generation" is the actual manufacture of power. See id. "Transmission" is moving
electric power on higher-voltage, larger lines to substations that step down the voltage for
distribution. See id. at 6-7 ("Higher voltage lines cost more, require bigger towers and
equipment and thus have a greater negative esthetic impact, but carry much more power:
A line with twice the voltage carries four times as much power."); DENISE WARKENTINGLENN, ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY IN NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 56 (2d ed.

2006). "Distribution" is distinguished from transmission as it involves moving power from
those substations to homes and businesses, usually over the familiar poles on the side of
the road. See PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra, at 8.
2. See FRED BOSSELMAN
ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 930 (3d ed. 2010) (noting the large distance

from renewable power sources to concentrations of customers); Halsey III, supra note 2
(noting that power company executives, as well as James J. Hoecker, chairman of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during the Clinton administration, warned that
without "significant .. . investment," the country was "headed for some serious financial
and economic difficulties"); Carl Zichella, The Future of the Grid: Why Modernizing Our
Nation's Aging Grid Is Critical, SWITCHBOARD: NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL

STAFF BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/czichella/thefuture
of thed...
why-mod.html. See generally JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D.
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also provide consumers with access to lower-cost power. And
productive yet remote sources of renewable wind and solar energy
require transmission to reach population centers.4
Against these benefits, utility companies and consumer
advocates, industry groups, and regulators worry about who will bear
the substantial cost of additional transmission line construction.5
Concerned advocates and regulators fear subsidization of faraway
energy sources and loss of control to the federal government, and
landowners fear loss of their land to new construction.' Some say that
proponents' claimed benefits can be achieved without construction of
large-scale transmission lines.'
Although some advocates support transmission so long as they
do not feel unfairly burdened by the costs, others support nontransmission alternatives. These supporters claim that electricity may
be better sourced locally to avoid costly transmission lines, avoid
efficiency losses from long-distance transportation of electricity,
promote growth and scaling of local renewable energy sources, and

CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW 367 (2d ed. 2011) (identifying utility interconnection as an

accepted method to "promote economic efficiency and reliability").
3. See Promoting Regional Transmission Planning and Expansion to Facilitate Fuel
Diversity Including Expanded Uses of Coal-Fired Resources, FERC Docket No. ADO5-3000 (May 13, 2005) (testimony of Karl Pfirrmann, President, PJM Western Region, PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C.) (noting that wholesale power markets may offer better prices to
consumers).
4. See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting TransmissionLines in a Changed Milieu:
Evolving Notions of the "Public Interest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations,
81 U. COLO. L. REV 705, 705-06 (2010) (noting the importance of increased transmission
for renewable generation).
5. Historically, transmission costs are about twelve percent of total costs of electric
power to consumers. See WARKENTIN-GLENN, supra note 1, at 55.
6. Cf Request for Clarification, or in the Alternative, Rehearing of the Coalition for
Fair Transmission Policy at 11, FERC Docket No. RM10-23-001 (Aug. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter Coalition for Fair Transmission] (contending in the context of FERC Order
No. 1000 that if transmission costs are broadly distributed, economic outcomes will be
worsened as consumers of electric generation services do not price the cost of transmission
into their buying decisions); Rachelle Channell, Who Am I?, PATH OF DESTRUCTION
(POTOMAC APPALACHIAN TRANSMISSION HIGHLINE), http://www.pathofdestruction
.org/who-am-i.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) (describing the efforts of one determined
landowner, Rachelle Channell of West Virginia, to oppose a line which would take a 2200foot right-of-way through her property).
7. See, e.g., Press Release, Coal. for Fair Transmission Policy, Coalition for Fair
Transmission Policy's Sheridan Discusses Senate RES Decision (July 26, 2010),
http://www.thecftp.org/uploads/JM1.pdf; John Farrell, Why Developing Better Renewable
Energy Isn't Enough, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Sept. 22, 2011, 1:31 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/09/22/325559/renewable-energy-roadblocks/.
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encourage local economic development that can accrue from
nurturing those local sources.8
This Comment analyzes the technical transmission planning
processes used to make decisions about this much-debated electric
transmission system. Nationwide, no uniform process exists for
making transmission construction decisions; planning processes are
carried out in diverse variations by public utilities and transmission
management entities, with varying levels of participation by
regulating entities and stakeholder groups.' Many of those who
believe that benefits may be gleaned from increased transmission
think that, in too many of these processes, the parties act parochially,
slowing construction of new transmission needed to cope with
increasing demands on the grid. 0
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), the
major federal regulator of electricity markets," believes transmission
decisions have not exhibited sufficient coordination. 2 FERC has
worked for the past several decades to build competitive wholesale
electricity markets to provide consumers with better rates, but those
markets' functionality depends on the existence of adequate
infrastructure." FERC has found that existing planning processes can
slow construction of needed transmission, permit higher selection of
suboptimal transmission projects, and allow utilities more potential to
discriminate and self-deal in electricity markets.'" FERC sees
8. See Press Release, Coal. for Fair Transmission Policy, supra note 7; Farrell, supra
note 7. See generally Sanya Carley et al., Energy-Based Economic Development, 15
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 282-95 (2011) (providing support for
this claim).
9. See infra Part I.A. The term "stakeholder group" refers to any party that is a part
of a transmission planning process but is not a "public utility transmission provider" as
defined by FERC. See infra note 17.
10. See, e.g., Brown & Rossi, supra note 4, at 711; Hoang Dang, New Power, Few New
Lines: A Need for a Federal Solution, 17 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 327, 328 (2002) ("[Imn
order to truly ... expand the transmission system, federal jurisdiction over transmission
must be expanded to allow the federal government to address the problems associated
with expansion of the transmission grid.").
11. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJEcT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE
US: A GUIDE 11 (2011), available at www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645; see
also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 380.
12. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 390.
13. See infra Part I.B. Just as a market for grain must be served by adequate roads,
railroads, or waterways to make trade efficient enough to lower prices, electricity markets
also require a sound infrastructure.
14. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 391-92; infra Part LB; see also Hearing
on Legislation Regarding Electric Transmission Lines Before the S. Comm. on Energy &
Natural Res., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) ("We need a national policy commitment to
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electricity markets as regional, from which it follows that transmission
planning must also be regional." FERC has therefore promulgated
Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by
Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, requiring
"public utility transmission providers"" to join regional transmission
planning processes and to create a regional plan for transmission
projects that regionally allocates those projects' costs."
Order 1000 has reverberated through the electric energy industry
and the nation's capital." It provoked widespread calls for rehearing
and clarification by some utilities, states, and other parties interested
in the consequences of transmission planning.2 0 These opponents
attack Order 1000 as bad policy and as an unlawful assertion of
FERC's authority that is not based on a proper factual foundation;
they claim that Order 1000 will lead to higher costs for consumers,
overconstruction of transmission lines, and impermissible
subsidization of certain preferred renewable energy sources. 2 1
Opponents are now appealing Order 1000.22
develop an extra-high voltage, EHV, transmission infrastructure to bring renewable
energy from remote areas where it's produced most efficiently to our large metropolitan
areas, where most of this Nation's power is consumed.").
15. Audio recording: Scott Hempling et al., FERC's Order 1000 Sets Transmission
Policy: Landmark, Land Mine, or Both?, National Regulatory Research Institute (Aug.
11, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
16. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35), order on reh'g and clarification,FERC Order No. 1000-A, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184
(May 31, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35), order on reh'g and clarification,FERC Order
No. 1000-B, 141 FERC 9161,044 (Oct. 18, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). Although
FERC Order 1000 mandates regional and interregional planning processes, FERC Order
No. 1000, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,846, this Comment avoids the clunky usage of the phrase
"regional and interregional," and instead simply discusses regional planning processes. An
interregional process is a planning process between two regions approved under Order
1000. Id. at 49,842.
17. "Public utility transmission providers" are entities that own or operate
transmission infrastructure, which are also regulated by FERC as public utilities under the
Federal Power Act. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,884 ("The term 'public
utility' ... means any person who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of
the [Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission under this subchapter...." (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 824(e) (2006))).
18. See id. at 49,844-45.
19. See generally The American Energy Initiative: Electric Transmission Issues,
Including Topics Related to the Siting, Planning, and Allocation of Costs for Electricity
Transmission Infrastructure:Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th
Cong. (2011) (dealing almost exclusively with FERC Order 1000).
20. See Linda R. Evers, NARUC and 62 Others Concerned About FERC Order 1000,
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.smartgridlegainews
SMART GRID LEGAL NEWS
.com/transmission-1/naruc-and-62-others-concerned-about-ferc-order-1000/.
21. See, e.g., Petition for Rehearing of the Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
at 43, FERC Docket No. RM10-23-000 (Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Southeastern
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This Comment argues, first, that although FERC is asserting new
authority over transmission planning, a reviewing court would likely
hold that FERC has not exceeded its statutory powers in this regard.
Although FERC has historically not asserted its full grant of statutory
jurisdiction in this area, Order 1000 more likely than not is consistent
with FERC's authority to regulate transmission of electricity in
interstate commerce. Second, this Comment argues that the changing
nature of the industry and FERC Order 1000 itself may have
exacerbated an existing problem with public interest representation in
transmission planning. Public interest groups, such as consumer,
renewable energy, and landowner groups, lack the time, expertise,
and funding to adequately inform themselves and ensure that they are
heard in the transmission planning process. Better including these
groups in the transmission planning process offers a way toward a
more equitable and efficient modernization strategy by reducing
acrimony and making transmission planning and construction a more
positive process. This Comment therefore proposes the creation of a
regional planning "Public Staff Model" advocate to provide public
interest representation in the Order 1000 process, which could help
make Order 1000 a more beneficial policy change.2 3
Part I of this Comment introduces the electric energy industry
and its regulators, paying special attention to the interaction between
the industry's transformation and the renewed interest in
transmission planning. Part II analyzes FERC's statutory authority to
promulgate Order 1000, and concludes that a reviewing court will
likely find the Order to be consistent with FERC's statutory
authority. Part III discusses the lingering public interest
representation problem. It notes that regionalization does not remedy
the representation problem, and may even decrease the opportunities
for public interest parties to represent their interests as compared to
other parties with greater resources. This Part posits that better

Utilities]; Request for Rehearing of the North Carolina Utilities Commission and the
Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities Commission at 6, FERC Docket No. RM10-23000 (Aug. 22,2011) [hereinafter North Carolina Utilities Commission].
22. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, No. 12-1232 (D.C. Cir. filed May 25,2012).
23. This regional planning public advocate is a new iteration of the "Regional Public
Advocate" idea proposed in 2007 in a more limited context by Michael H. Dworkin and
Rachel A. Goldwasser. See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel A. Goldwasser, Ensuring
Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional
Transmission Organizations,28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 595-96 (2007). Such a concept is now
needed even more than when Dworkin and Goldwasser wrote in 2007, as regional
planning will become mandatory nationwide. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at
49,843.
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including public interest groups in the transmission planning process
would help confer the maximum benefits from Order 1000. In
proposing the Public Staff Model reform to address the public interest
representation problem, this Part also delves into the institutional
considerations necessary to protect the public interest in this central
sector of the economy.
I. STATE, LOCAL, AND INCREASING FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE
TRANSFORMING ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

A. A Brief Introduction to the Structure of the Electric Power
Industry and Its Regulation by States and Localities
The historic state and local regulation over the developing
electric power industry likely informs states' thinking about the
deference they should be afforded in the regulation of electric power.
In the initial development of electric utilities in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century, local authorities carried out most
utility regulation. 24 State regulators soon preempted local regulators
after widespread problems of corruption, controversy over siting
decisions, and utilities' frustration with the multiplicity of local
regulations.2 5

States' electric utility regulation traditionally consisted of
common law rules, which had previously been imposed on public
utilities by the courts.26 These rules included a duty to serve the public
within a fixed territory, over which the utility was given monopoly
power, and a concurrent duty to provide adequate service and charge
only reasonable rates." The regulating authority set the rates that
electric utilities could charge, and these rates could only cover the
costs of those investments in utility infrastructure and other essential
expenses that the regulatory authority approved for cost recovery.28
Electric utility companies were traditionally vertically integrated,
meaning that a utility company owned the three parts of the electric
supply chain-generation, transmission, and distribution-and

24. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 4, at 707. Regulation of utilities by local
governments focused mostly on land use issues. Id.
25. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 62.
26. See id. at 46.
27. Id.
28. See id.
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included in its regulator-approved rate the costs of all parts of the
supply chain "bundled" together.2 9
In the 1980s, state regulators began to require utilities to submit
to more vigorous regulation, which in many states took the form of a
state integrated resource planning process. 0 The states that
developed these integrated resource planning processes did so nonuniformly, but generally, the processes share certain characteristics:
each is a "planning and selection process for new energy resources
that evaluates the full range of alternatives, including new generating
capacity, power purchases, energy conservation and efficiency ... and
renewable energy resources, in order to provide adequate and
reliable service to its electric customers at the lowest system cost." 3'
Under state integrated resource planning, utilities must receive
approval from the state utility regulator for their integrated resource
plan, which usually describes the company's projected loads and
investments over a ten- to twenty-year time horizon.3 2 Pursuant to the
requirements of integrated resource planning, utilities in most states
must also return to the state regulator every several years to have
updates approved. Where states have required integrated resource
planning processes, the plans are important in securing a state
commission's approval of utilities' certificates of public convenience
and necessity that utilities must obtain to construct.34 Because
29. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 1 (2002) (noting that utilities were
traditionally regulated over their "bundled" services, which included rate regulation over
the cost of generation, transmission, and distribution); TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note
2, at 368-70 (describing the nature of the electric industry and how rates are regulated by
states).
30. See RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETERSON, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, A
BRIEF SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 1 (2011),
http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSFIRP-Survey-Final_2011-0428.pdf. Clean Skies Foundation is a non-profit advocating for greater use of natural gas.
About, CLEAN SKIES, http://www.cleanskies.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
31. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 111(d)(19), 106 Stat. 2776, 2796
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2602 (2006)) (defining the contours of the integrated
resource plan that the federal government would use for evaluating public power systems,
which was based on the states' experiences).
32. See WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 30, at 7.
33. Id. at 8. For example, North Carolina requires a planning horizon of fifteen years
and requires the utilities to return to the North Carolina Utilities Commission for
approval every two years. Integrated Resource Planning and Filings, 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
11.R8-60 (2012).
34. See State ex. rel Util. Comn'n v. N.C. Elec. Membership Corp., 105 N.C. App.
136, 141, 412 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1992) (clarifying that in North Carolina, although the
integrated resource plan is required of public utilities, it is no substitute for the
requirement to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity); Preliminary Plans
and Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity, 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 11.R8-61
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integrated resource planning requires that the full range of
alternatives be included, a discussion of the transmission
infrastructure to serve those alternatives must take place within the
integrated resource planning process." In addition, utilities must
show that their investments were prudently incurred so that they can
include the infrastructure costs in the rate base and recover those
costs from ratepayers in their next general rate case.
The general increase in state regulatory oversight during the
1970s and 1980s also manifested itself in greater state assertion of
authority over transmission siting. Congress has generally not given
federal regulators siting jurisdiction for electric transmission, and
FERC is thought not to have siting authority in all except the
narrowest of cases.
Transmission planning, however, remained primarily the
function of individual utilities in almost all parts of the country until
the 1990s.3 9 And, in significant parts of the country, individual utilities
40
have retained control over their transmission planning, and will
41
continue to do so until Order 1000 is implemented. Some utilities
(2012); Brown & Rossi, supra note 4, at 714-16 (noting that Colorado and many other
states require a certificate of public convenience and necessity before major electric
infrastructure may be constructed).
35. See, e.g., N.C. Elec. Membership Corp., 105 N.C. App. at 139, 412 S.E.2d at 168
(summarizing North Carolina's integrated resource plan, where "[elach plan filed was
required to... [give] due consideration to existing and new generating facilities,
alternative energy resources, conservation and load management programs, purchased
power, and transmission and distribution facilities"); cf N.C. TRANSMISSION PLANNING
COLLABORATIVE
REPORT ON THE NCTPC 2010-2020
COLLABORATIVE,
0 1
TRANSMISSION PLAN 12, 15 (2011), http://www.nctpc.orgnctpcidocument/REF/2 1 -01the
(recognizing
19/2010-2020%20NCTPC%2OReport%201-18-11 %20FINAL.pdf
integration of transmission planning into overall integrated resource planning, the North
Carolina state-level transmission planning process explicitly provides that "[tihe
Collaborative Transmission Plan information is available to Participants for identification
of any alternative least cost resources for potential inclusion in their respective Integrated
Resource Plans").
36. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJEcT, supra note 11, at 40-41.
37. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 4, at 708-10.
38. See id. at 745. Congress did grant limited backstop siting authority in 2005, but
even this limited authority has been further circumscribed by the Fourth Circuit to the
point where its practical effect is negligible. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558
F.3d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 2009).
39. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 66; see also, e.g.,
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 111 (Miss. 1984) (describing the
public utility transmission working group's meeting minutes where the public utility
determined the need for transmission construction and the transmission line that would
fulfill that need).
40. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supranote 11, at 66-67.
41. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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that retained individual control over their transmission planning did
embark on voluntary collaborative planning processes with others in
their states or regions.4 2 The projects that result from these processes
represent the utilities' forecasts of where transmission is needed to
connect generation to consumers or otherwise support demand or
achieve reliability.43 The utilities can recover only the costs of
approved infrastructure from ratepayers, so each individual utility has
an incentive to build their preferred transmission into their state
integrated resource plan.44
The importance of transmission planning is that, subject to state
regulatory approval, any utility's or other transmission-managing
entity's transmission plan effectively makes the decisions about
transmission construction, the generation that will serve consumers,
and cost allocation of transmission lines.45 For example, Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. Conerly4 6 relates a tale of how important
transmission planning is for approval of a utility's infrastructure.
There, Mississippi Power & Light ("MP&L") had planned to build
the high-voltage line from Mississippi to the Louisiana border, where
it would connect to another line to sell power to New Orleans
customers.47 MP&L justified the need on reliability grounds.48 The
utility had included the line in its regional planning process, and the
line had been granted cost recovery by the Mississippi Public Service
Commission." MP&L planned to charge the $24 million cost of the
line to Mississippi ratepayers "even though not one Mississippi
42. For example, there is a North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative
(NCTPC) consisting of Duke Energy Carolinas, Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., North
Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, and ElectriCities of North Carolina, as well as
other stakeholders. N.C. TRANSMISSION PLANNING COLLABORATIVE, supra note 35, at
1. These groups, all within the state of North Carolina, work together for enhanced
transmission planning, reliability, and least-cost cost allocation. See id. This program has a
detailed iterative planning process, with several committees that meet to consider the
issues of reliability and enhanced transmission access. See id. at 4, 7-8. Because the
planning groups are located within North Carolina, the transmission projects approved by
the planning process are overwhelmingly focused on in-state transmission planning. See id.
at 65 (listing the projects considered by the transmission planning collaborative).
43. See, e.g., id. at 65-80 (providing a list of projects resulting from one planning
process and noting the progress in each project).
44. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 42 ("Historically, transmission
planning has been the basis for the long-term expansion of the [transmission] system,
leading to transmission siting and construction decisions and the effectuation of resource
planning decisions."); REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 36.
45. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 42-44.
46. 460 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1984).
47. Id. at 108.
48. See id. at 112.
49. See id.
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customer [would] receive electricity" from the proposed transmission
line.50 Because the line would not provide electricity to Mississippi
customers, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the line did
not constitute a sufficiently public purpose and revoked the project's
eminent domain authority." The case illustrates how easily the results
of a utility's transmission planning processes can move through the
normal regulatory process and gain cost recovery.
It is true that a utility need not bring the projects approved in
any utility's (or group of utilities') transmission planning process to
the states' integrated resource planning process," to the cost recovery
determination in a rate case, or to a attempt to secure siting approval.
Nevertheless, these projects are the ones that will be available in any
formal, planned manner. It is these proposals the utilities will take to
the state regulators for siting approval and cost recovery decisionmaking and based upon need to move power to customers." Thus,
the projects that emerge from transmission planning processes have a
disproportionate likelihood of being approved in the other state
regulatory processes.5 4 Once the transmission planning is complete,
groups that might like to change the nature of the transmission
system, rather than just the precise location of a proposed line, have
effectively already lost the opportunity for meaningful input. Their
50. Id.
51. Id. at 113.
52. For one example of how the transmission planning process interacts with the
integrated resource plan process on paper, see N.C. TRANSMISSION PLANNING
COLLABORATIVE, supra note 35, at 12 ("The Collaborative Transmission Plan

information is available to Participants for identification of any alternative least cost
resources for potential inclusion in their respective Integrated Resource Plans." (emphasis
added)). The reality, as this Comment explains, is quite different.
53. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 42. These planned projects are also
the ones that will enter the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process if a major
new transmission line is contemplated. But once the NEPA process is embarked upon, the
project is already envisioned and the most effective times for changing the nature of the
project have passed. See generally Siting, NEPA, and Permitting: Understanding the
Process, TRI-STATE GENERATION & TRANSMISSION ASS'N, http://www.tristategt

.org/transmission/documents/NEPASitingT-S-general.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2013)
(providing an example of how public utility transmission providers see the NEPA process
as part of the post-planning siting process).

54. See generally Miss. Power & Light Co., 460 So. 2d 107 (providing an example of

state public utility commission approval of a utility's transmission construction plan to fit
the utility's planning process, even though it arguably did not directly benefit in-state

consumers). Cf Report of the System Reliability, Planning,and Compliance Committee, 30
ENERGY L.J. 831, 862 (2009) ("Transmission planning is a critical function ... because it

is the means by which customers consider and access new sources of energy and have an
opportunity to explore the feasibility of non-transmission alternatives." (quoting FERC
Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,267 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35,
37))).
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absence in the early stages of the process has negative effects later in
the process.
Given the importance of utilities' decision-making in the
transmission planning processes, it is understandable why FERC
believes that the transmission planning process is a central focus for
reform. Some utilities that control transmission planning have lowcost generation and at the same time are not interested in building
additional generation capacity to export their power." These utilities
fear that transmission capacity would simply add costs to their rates.
Consequently, the utilities may not favor construction of large
transmission lines and can manage their planning process accordingly.
Other utilities that want to emphasize local sources of power, local
renewables development, or energy efficiency could have relatively
little interest in regional transmission lines." And utilities that have
higher-cost generation may have little impetus to open discussions
about interstate transmission lines that would allow less-expensive
generation to undercut their own." On the other hand, some utility
companies might be more interested in constructing large
transmission lines if these utilities can export their power and can
show that benefits will flow in part toward other utilities, and
therefore hope that other utilities will bear some of the costs." In
sum, the ability to plan and operate transmission allows transmission
owning and operating entities to have a great say in the decision of
how grid modernization and capacity growth will occur, and who will
pay.

55. See Comments of Southern Company Services, Inc. at 9-13, FERC Docket No.
RM10-23-000 (Sept. 29, 2010) (describing planning in the Southeast that results in
"construct[ing] generation near to load, resulting in there being little need
for vast,
interregional transmission lines"); REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at
66.
56. See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting
Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1041-43 (2009) (noting likely ramifications of overbuilding
transmission lines for some utilities and ratepayers).
57. See FERC Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,318 ("A transmission provider also
does not have an incentive to increase the import or export capacity of its transmission
system if doing so would allow cheaper power to displace its higher cost generation or
otherwise make new entry more profitable by facilitating exports.").
58. See, e.g., Farrell,supra note 7 (pointing to the ratepayer-funded subsidization of
long-distance transmission lines that was protested by ten eastern state governors in a
letter to Congress).
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The Move to Competitive Wholesale Power Markets, the Federal
Government's IncreasedRegulatory Role, and FERC Order1000
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution," Congress passed Part II of the Federal Power Act
("FPA") in 1935.60 Since then, FERC has had authority over "the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale
61
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." FPA section
201(d) defines wholesale electricity sales as "a sale of electric energy
to any person for resale."62 Wholesale sales mostly consist of electric
generators selling power to each other on the wholesale electric
markets, and to load-serving entities pursuant to long-term contracts,
as electric utilities attempt to secure the lowest price of electricity to
resell to their retail customers at state commission-approved retail
rates.63 In contrast, retail electricity sales are sales to end users,' and
FPA section 201(b) states that federal regulation "shall not apply to
65 Congress
any other [non-wholesale] sale of electric energy."
provided that federal authority would "extend only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the states."' Congress
specifically exempted from federal regulation "facilities used for the
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local
distribution."67 Thus, the 1930s-era electric supply chain industry was
divided, with generation and distribution and bundled retail service to
be controlled by the states, and wholesale and unbundled
transmission in interstate commerce controlled by the federal
government.
Congress also gave FERC the responsibility, which continues
today, of ensuring that the electric rates subject to its jurisdiction (i.e.

B.

59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
60. Ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 838 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C). Federal regulation of interstate electricity transmission was carried out through
the Federal Power Commission (FPC), which after 1977 was reorganized into FERC. See
Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 401-402, 91 Stat. 565, 58283 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra
note 2, at 142, 159. This Comment will refer to FERC, although it may be that only the
FPC existed during the referenced time period.
61. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006); see also TOMAIN & CUDAHY,
supra note 2, at 374.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
63. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 10 (noting that

distribution-only utilities buy their power from upstream wholesale providers).
64. See PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 1, at 304.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).
66. Id. § 824(a).
67. Id. § 824(b)(1).
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"the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and ...
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce"') are
just and reasonable, and not discriminatory, in FPA section 205.69
Complimentarily, FPA section 206 requires that "for any transmission
or sale subject" to FERC's jurisdiction, when FERC finds rates, or a
"practice ... affecting such rates," unjust, unreasonable, or exhibiting
undue discrimination, it "shall determine the just and reasonable rate
[or] practice ... and shall fix the same by order."' These two sections
have formed the basis for FERC's recent regulation at issue in this
Comment."
The dual federal authority in two overlapping but distinct
spheres-transmission and wholesale electric energy sales-has been
a source of conflict. The problem was litigated in the United States
Supreme Court as receiitly as 2002 in New York v. FERC.7 2 Here,
FERC claimed that FPA section 206's grant constituted sufficient
authority to order public utility transmission providers to provide
open access to any transmission lines, i.e. transmit any generator's
electricity, over any interstate transmission facility used to offer
unbundled service," whether wholesale or retail.7 4 This assertion
under FPA section 206 seemed, to opponents of FERC's action, to
exceed the statutory language dealing with rates or practices in
wholesale sales given that FPA section 201(a) withheld federal
authority from extending to matters regulated by the states, such as
retail sales.7 s Nevertheless, on the logic that the electrons' physical
flow in the transmission system does not conform to state
68. Id.
69. See id. § 824d(a) ("All rates . . . by any public utility for or in connection with the

transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, . . .
shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is
hereby declared to be unlawful."); id. § 824d(b) ("Preference or advantage unlawful-No
public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or
subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any
unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either
as between localities or as between classes of service.").
70. Id. § 824e(a).
71. See infra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
72. 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
73. When utilities "unbundle" their services (i.e., generation, transmission,
distribution, etc.), they separate the operations and accounting of each service and seek
rate recovery for each service separately. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 511,
522-23.
74. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 11.

75. See id. at 22-24. See generally Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006)
(limiting the scope of FERC's authority to matters not subject to regulation by the states);
id. § 824(b)(1) (limiting the scope of FERC's authority over sales for wholesale).
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boundaries,"6 the Court upheld FERC's authority over unbundled
transmission of electric energy for retail sales in interstate commerce,
despite that such authority was not explicitly granted by FPA section
206 and could be said to be undermined by the FPA section 201(a)
language." The Court held that FERC had authority to ensure just
and reasonable rates in electric transmission in interstate commerce.
The majority explained in dicta that "the landscape of the electric
industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA" and that the
Court had in the past interpreted FERC's authority over transmission
broadly,79 implying it would do so again.
Indeed, since the late 1970s, with the passage of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA")," the electric industry
has been transforming. Congress, the executive branch, and especially
FERC have been steadily moving the industry toward using
competitive wholesale markets for electricity sales.' Many energy
regulators believe that wholesale markets offer robust benefits to
consumers, where wholesale buyers can reliably purchase less
expensive energy from suppliers across the nation and then sell at

76. New York v. FERC,535 U.S. at 32 n.5, 33.
77. Id. at 22-24.
78. Id. at 14, 19-20.

79. Id. at 15-16 ("The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of § 201 of
the FPA, which this Court has construed broadly, supported FERC's regulation of
transmissions in interstate commerce [through § 206] that were part of unbundled retail
sales, as § 201 gives FERC jurisdiction over the 'transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce,' Even if the FPA were ambiguous, the Court of Appeals explained
that, given the technological complexities of the transmission grid, it would have deferred
to the Commission's interpretation of § 201 'as giving it jurisdiction over both wholesale
and retail transmissions.' " (citation omitted)); see also Isaac D. Benkin, Who Makes the
Rules? Federal and State Jurisdictionover Electric TransmissionAccess, 13 ENERGY L.J.
45, 49 (1992); cf William L. Massey et al., Reliability-Based Competition in Wholesale
Electricity: Legal and Policy Perspectives, 25 ENERGY L.J. 319, 325-26 (2004) (arguing
that the recognition of FERC's broad authority over transmission implicates FERC's

authority in other areas regulated by the FPA, such as mandatory reliability).
80. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16,42, and 43 U.S.C.).
81. See Samuel R. Brumberg, Note, Getting the Camel out of the Tent: Behind the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Rise to Power and the Importance of States'
Continued Regulatory Oversight,30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 691, 698-99

(2006) (describing the major consequences of PURPA, including the implications for
wholesale competition). With respect to wholesales, PURPA's main contribution was to
require public utility companies to purchase electricity from co-generation sources under

certain circumstances. Id. For example, if a paper mill produced steam as a by-product, it
could use co-generation to generate electricity and a public utility company would have to
buy that electricity. Id.
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better prices to consumers." However, other market participants do
believe that wholesale competition has seriously harmed consumers
by allowing companies to overcharge consumers.
FERC and proponents of wholesale markets made some
progress toward competitive markets when Congress provided the
regulatory framework to force open the competitive market for all
wholesale power generators in the Energy Policy Act of 1992
("EPAct 1992").' EPAct 1992 amended the FPA to give FERC
authority to order utilities, on a case-by-case basis, to provide open
access to their transmission lines.' Up to this point, vertically
integrated utilities controlled their entire transmission infrastructure
for their proper benefit; they could blatantly discriminate and even
forbid other generators from selling power through their lines."
In 1996, FERC concluded that to remedy this still-ongoing
discrimination, it needed to open up the wholesale markets by
requiring all utilities to provide open access, for wholesale purposes,
to their transmission lines.8 7 Finding the limited remedial authority
granted in EPAct 1992 insufficient, FERC depended on its FPA
section 206 authority to issue Order No. 888 to require open-access
transmission on a wholesale market-wide basis.8 Order 888 also
required that utilities unbundle transmission and generation, which
82. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Article, Bringing the Camel into the Tent:
State and Federal Power over Electricity Transmission, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 87
(2001). There are additional reasons that competitive wholesale markets are desirable
public policy. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 612-14. Competition in wholesale
power markets can be more efficient than regulating utilities as monopolies, if carried out
correctly. David B. Spence, The Politicsof Electricity Restructuring: Theory v. Practice,40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 418, 442 (2005). Although electric distribution and
transmission are almost universally considered natural monopolies-monopolies justified
economically by their increasing returns to scale-the sale of that electricity is not a
natural monopoly. See id. at 422. This was amply demonstrated wher public utilities were
forced to buy power from smaller co-generation plants and smaller renewable power
producers beginning in the late 1970s, and these smaller plants were able to operate as
efficiently as the larger utilities. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 379-82 (describing
the effects of PURPA). Therefore, from an economic perspective, the sale of generated
power on wholesale markets need not be regulated as if it were a natural monopoly. Id.
83. See, e.g., AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, CONSUMERS IN PERIL: WHY RTO-RUN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS FAIL TO PRODUCE JUST AND REASONABLE ELECTRIC RATES
1-4 (2008), availableat http://appanet.cms-plus.com/files/PDFs/ConsumersinPeril.pdf.
84. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12, 16,26, and 42 U.S.C.).
85. Id. § 721, 106 Stat. at 2915.
86. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 384-85.
87. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 10-12 (2002).
88. FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pts. 35, 385).
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vertically integrated utilities had previously managed and offered as a
bundled service.89
After ordering open-access transmission, FERC saw the absence
of construction of new transmission lines as a major remaining barrier
to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market, including bringing
renewables online.90 In December 1999, FERC promulgated Order
No. 2000 to create the requirements for an entity to be known as a
Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO") and to encourage
public utilities to join these new entities.9 ' RTOs were created as
organizations of two or more "public utilities . .. that own, operate, or

control interstate transmission facilities" and meet the requirements
set out by FERC.12 The idea behind the RTO concept was to move
the management of transmission assets away from public utilities,
which might be tempted to discriminate in making transmission
93
decisions, including where and when to construct transmission.
To that end, FERC required all public utility transmission
providers to file a proposal for becoming part of an RTO, or "a
description of efforts to participate in an RTO, any existing obstacles
to RTO participation, and any plans to work toward RTO
participation." To be designated as an RTO under Order 2000, an
organization needed to possess twelve minimum characteristics and
functions focusing on the organization's independence from utilities,

89. See WARKENTIN-GLENN, supra note 1, at 124; see also FERC Order No. 888, 61
Fed. Reg. at 21,552.
90. see TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 390-91; cf Catherine Connors,
Transmission Preemption, PUB. UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2010, at 48 (noting that
the major goal of FERC Order No. 2000 was more efficient transmission planning).
91. FERC Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35). FERC acted under its FPA section 205 authority to ensure that rates, terms, and
conditions of transmission for interstate commerce are just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory, as well as FERC's authority under FPA section 202(a) to promote
voluntary interconnection of transmission facilities by public utilities and non-public
utilities. Id.
92. FERC Order No. 2000, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,390, 31,391 (proposed June 10, 1999)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also FERC Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. at 945;
TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 390 (describing RTOs generally). RTOs typically
take the form of non-profit Independent System Operators (ISOs), which existed and
were regulated prior to Order 2000; however, Order 2000 imposed additional process and
planning conditions for RTOs. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 392-93.
93. Id. at 392-95.
94. FERC Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. at 812. FERC claimed the integration into
RTOs to be voluntary, and although parties disputed the voluntariness, the D.C. Circuit
ultimately affirmed the Order and the voluntary nature of RTO relationship in Public
Utility DistrictNo. 1 of Snohomish County v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607,616 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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capacity, and engagement in coordination.' These requirements
made the RTO a defined institution with certain characteristics and a
set governance structure. 6 Some utilities voluntarily joined together
to create RTOs, but in parts of the country, utility companies resisted
joining RTOs for some of the same reasons they have resisted Order
1000.1
In 2002, FERC proposed a new rulemaking, Standard Market
Design ("SM!D"), the relevant part of which mandated that all public
utilities under FERC's jurisdiction join an RTO and for all RTOs to
carry out regional transmission expansion policies." Given the strong
objections to SMD from the states that believed the federal
government was exceeding its authority," FERC abandoned this
effort when it decided to focus on securing passage of the EPAct of
2005.100
The most recent major FERC Order on transmission planning
before Order 1000 was Order No. 890,11 initially promulgated in
2007, which applied to the planning processes of all public utility
transmission providers (and in certain cases, to those of non-public
95. The minimum characteristics for an RTO included independence, scope and
regional configuration, operational authority, and short-term reliability. FERC Order No.
2000, 65 Fed. Reg. at 152. The minimum functions for an organization to be approved as
an RTO as outlined under Order 2000 were: "administer[ing] its own tariff and
employ[ing] a transmission pricing system that will promote efficient use and expansion of
transmission and generation facilities;" ability to manage congestion; ability to address
parallel path flow issues within the grid; ability to offer ancillary services of last resort; the
degree of total transmission capability and available transmission capability; and abilities
to engage in market monitoring, planning, and coordination of expansion of transmission.
Id. at 323-24.
96. See generally Dworkin and Goldwasser, supra note 23 (discussing the structure of
RTOs).
97. See, e.g., Rosy Lum, Duke ProgressDeal Hits Roadblocks, ENERGYBIZ (Dec. 19,
2011),
http://www.energybiz.com/article/11/12/duke-progress-deal-hits-roadblocks
(reporting that "[t]he South has traditionally had some of the lowest rates in the country,"
and that "[t]he South says there's nothing for it to gain from [joining an RTO], and the
RTOs are expensive").
98. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 399.
99. Telephone Interview with Gisele Rankin, Staff Attorney, Pub. Staff of the N.C.
Util. Comm'n (Nov. 3,2011).
100. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered
chapters of the U.S.C.); TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 399-400 ("[I]n connection
with efforts to secure the passage of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, the FERC terminated the
SMD proceeding.").
101. FERC Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pts. 35, 37), orderon reh'g, Order No. 890-A, 73 Fed. Reg. 2,984 (Dec. 28, 2007) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-B, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,092 (July 8,
2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-C, 74 Fed. Reg.
12,540 (Nov. 25, 2009) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37), order on clarification,Order No.
890-D, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,511 (Nov. 19, 2009) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37).
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utility transmission providers), including those of FERC-approved
RTOs.102 The Order implemented more specific guidelines and
specified stakeholder treatment in the transmission planning
process.103 Among other characteristics, it aimed to ensure that any
transmission planning process engaged in by transmission providers
was well-coordinated, open, and transparent.'0 In terms of openness,
Order 890 required that the planning process generally be open to all
stakeholders in addition to transmission providers and state
regulators."os Order 890 also required transparency: data,
methodology, and transmission modeling had to be reducible to
writing and made available to any stakeholder.106
FERC Order 1000 thus represents the latest iteration of a series
of FERC reforms that FERC hopes will support competitive
wholesale markets, reduce any opportunities for discrimination, and
provide lower rates to consumers. The transmission planning regime
under Order 1000 strikingly differs from Order 890 and previous
orders because Order 1000 requires that all public utility transmission
providers participate in a regional transmission planning process with
regional cost allocation." It does not generally allow entities to file in
their FERC tariff a reason for not joining the process, like Order
2000, nor does it modify the existing RTO structure and again
encourage voluntary collaboration, like Order 890.10o Order 1000
universally requires public utility transmission providers to create a
regional transmission plan that incorporates the majority of the Order
890 planning principles, and to allocate the costs of transmission

102. FERC Order. No. 890,72 Fed. Reg. at 12,279, 12,285.
103. See id. at 12,279.
104. Id. Order 890 emphasized eight principles, of which principles (1)-(6) and (8)
were then incorporated as required into the Order 1000 regional transmission planning
processes: (1) coordination; (2) openness; (3) transparency; (4) information exchange; (5)
comparability; (6) dispute resolution; (7) regional participation; and (8) congestion studies.
Id. at 12,319; FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,854-55 (Aug. 11, 2011)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
105. FERC Order 890,72 Fed. Reg. at 12,323.
106. Id. at 12,324 ("[T]ransmission providers will be required to reduce to writing and
make available the basic methodology, criteria, and processes they use to develop their
transmission plans."). Order 890 further stated that this "information should enable
customers, other stakeholders, or an independent third party to replicate the results of
planning studies and thereby reduce the incidence of after-the-fact disputes regarding
whether planning has been conducted in an unduly discriminatory fashion." Id. at 12,32425.
107. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,854, 49,868-69.
108. See id. at 49,868.
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projects regionally through this planning process.109 In the sense of
being universally required, Order 1000 more closely resembles the
aborted SMD proceeding, albeit with a more nuanced touch, as it
focuses only on requiring certain parameters for planning processes.
Order 1000 builds on the Order 890 principles. It emphasizes
coordination and communication between transmission providers in
the regional transmission plan, as well as coordination with
customers, affected state authorities, and other stakeholders. 0 Order
1000 directs that customers and other stakeholders be given a
meaningful opportunity to participate, and not merely to comment,
which means participating early enough in the process to matter,"'
but it stops short of requiring any set number of meetings or
mandating the content of those meetings.112 It requires that the
transmission planning process be open and transparent."' Order 1000
also requires that non-transmission solutions be considered on a
comparable basis with transmission solutions." 4 With their emphasis
on coordination, openness, transparency, and comparability, these
Order 1000 planning principles mark a clear good-faith attempt to
prioritize inclusion of all stakeholder groups in the new, required
regional planning processes.
FERC Order 1000 was promulgated under FPA section 206 and
its directive to FERC to remedy practices affecting a rate in wholesale
electric energy sales that are unjust, unreasonable, or unduly
discriminatory."' FERC continues to believe that consumers benefit
from "just and reasonable rates" when vigorous wholesale

109. See id. at 49,868-69. FERC does not stipulate how large the regions must be, but
says they must be larger than the geographic scope of one utility. Id. at 49,868. The regions
are listed in the compliance tariffs filed at FERC. The decisions about cost allocations are
critical to determining whether a transmission project will go forward because they will
determine whether the project can be paid for. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at
43.
110. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,868-70; James J. Hoecker,
Transmission Planning-A New Lever for the FERC?, NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY, Aug.
2007, at 21.
111. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,868.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2006). Order 1000 is "intended to improve transmission
planning processes and cost allocation mechanisms ... to ensure that the rates, terms and
conditions of service provided by public utility transmission providers are just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential." FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 49,844-45.
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competition is present, and it hopes to support that competition with
planning processes that facilitate better infrastructure decisions.116
II. FERC's ORDER 1000 TRANSMISSION PLANNING REFORMS ARE
UNLIKELY TO BE REVERSED FOR EXCEEDING THE AGENCY'S
STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Despite the emphasis on coordination and openness of Order
1000's required planning process, some utilities, states, and other
groups remain opposed to FERC's transmission planning reforms."'7
These opponents have a number of understandable concerns. Some
believe that FERC's regional planning process directives will
complicate the utilities' own transmission planning and redistribute
the costs of transmission from remote renewable energy sources to
states that have other policy priorities, including encouraging local
renewables or prioritizing lower rates.118 Some utilities are also
concerned about overbuilding transmission because it might make
state regulators reluctant to include the vertically integrated utilities'
own prioritized transmission projects in cost recovery."' These
utilities, together with states, worry about the de facto FERC
regulation of transmission siting decisions, previously discussed,
which would constrain the utilities' overall business strategy and state
regulators' own siting power. 120 Finally, some states see the regional
planning process as unaccountable and one that will indirectly and
unlawfully preempt state jurisdiction over core public utility services
116. Hempling et al., supra note 15, at 5:50.
117. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the critics of Order 1000 hail from areas where
it affects the greatest change from business-as-usual: the Western and Southeastern
United States, where the electric utilities have generally participated less in RTOs. See
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO),
FERC, http://www.fere.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
The transmission planning requirements of Order 1000 are similar to those requirements
already implemented by the RTOs' transmission planning processes. Hempling et al.,
supra note 15.
118. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 42; Coalition for Fair Transmission,
supra note 6, at 5; Rossi, supra note 56, at 1041-43; Press Release, Statement on the
Introduction of the Electric Transmission Customer Protection Act, Coal. for Fair
Transmission Pol'y (Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://thecftp.org/uploads
ICFTPCorkerstatement2-18-11_Final.docx ("Socializing the costs of transmission lines
to access remote renewable resources amounts to an expensive subsidy for some
renewable energy developers that distorts the marketplace, and ultimately results in
higher electricity prices for everyone.").
119. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 57.
120. See id. at 43; South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff, RE: Docket No. RM1023-000-Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission and Operating
Public Utilities at 2, FERC Docket No. RM10-23-000 (Aug. 22, 2011); North Carolina
Utilities Commission, supra note 21, at 1-2.
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and protection of consumers.' 2 1 Although as discussed above, there is
a possibility that some opponents could be taking a self-serving
position against efficient and equitably funded transmission
construction, that does not diminish the force of these critiques of
FERC Order 1000. However, the true extent of the actual economic
benefits and costs of this newly promulgated reform is outside the
scope of this Comment.
To avoid these perceived undesirable policy outcomes,
opponents of Order 1000 filed comments with FERC containing legal
arguments to position themselves for appellate review. Many of these
parties have appealed Order 1000 to the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 122 Critics hope for at least a remand of
Order 1000 for being an agency action "not in accordance with law"
and "arbitrary and capricious" under Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") section 706(a)(2).' 3
This Part proceeds to analyze whether FERC is likely to be
reversed for exceeding its statutory authority. It concludes, applying
the familiar framework of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.124 and its progeny, 125 that Congress has probably
not directly spoken to the issue, that Order 1000 is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute, and that FERC is not likely to be

121. See, e.g., North Carolina Utilities Commission, supra note 21, at 9-10; Request for
Rehearing and Clarification of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners at 3-4, FERC Docket No. RM10-23-000 (Aug. 22, 2011); cf South
Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff, supra note 120, at 2 (supporting the comments of the
Petition for Rehearing of the Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities).
122. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, No. 12-1232 (D.C. Cir. filed May 25, 2012).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). This Comment does not reach the argument that
Order 1000 was arbitrary and capricious under Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation
of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), either for
failure to address an important regulatory alternative or failure to respond to important
evidence presented against the agency. See id. at 30-31. It is beyond this Comment's scope
to evaluate the voluminous evidence required to make a determination of such a question.
It should be noted that in denying rehearing in Order 1000-A, released in May 2012,
FERC paid greater attention to addressing whether Order 1000 was in fact based on
substantial evidence rather than conjecture, and spent relatively less time discussing
whether it exceeded its statutory authority. See FERC Order No. 1000-A, 77 Fed. Reg.
32,184, 32,185-32,302 (May 31, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). For example, Order
1000-A summarizes many of the following type of comment: "NARUC argues that Order
No. 1000 does not identify actual concerns or problems or rely on any factual record, but
relies entirely on the conclusory statement that planning and cost allocation may be
impeding the development of beneficial transmission lines." Id. at 32,191.
124. 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984).
125. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218,226 (1994).
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reversed for acting outside the FPA. This Part then briefly discusses
some of the likely policy consequences.
A.

The Standardof Review of Order1000 Will Be Chevron
As a formal agency rulemaking, petitions for review of FERC
Order 1000 are presumptively evaluated under Chevron and its
progeny.126

From a positive legal standpoint, FERC's interpretation of the
FPA will likely not be subject to the presumption against preemption,
nor held to be a fundamental and avulsive change in the
interpretation of Congress's regulatory structure by FERC, either of
which could cause FERC's interpretation to lose Chevron
deference.12 The presumption against preemption reflects the idea
that a federal statute should not preempt state law unless Congress
has created a clear statement of intent to preempt. 128 This Subpart of
the Comment will proceed by discussing the presumption against
preemption and whether Order 1000 is a fundamental and avulsive
change, concluding that these doctrines should not apply, and then
proceeding to the Chevron analysis.
Order 1000 should not be evaluated under the presumption
against preemption such that Chevron would not apply. In New York
v. FERC the Court held that there is no presumption against
preemption when the question is one of defining the scope of
congressionally delegated authority.'29 The FPA clearly delegates
congressional authority over transmission in interstate commerce to
3 o so the preemption analysis should collapse into a typical
FERC,1
126. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. FERC, 334 F.3d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("FERC's
interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction is entitled to Chevron deference.").
127. See Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L.
REv. 667, 680-81 (2011) ("[T]hough the cases generally seem to suggest that full,
Chevron-style deference is inappropriate in preemption cases, and at least a few Justices
are willing to formally renounce the doctrine, the Court has yet to disavow Chevron's
applicability in preemption cases."). Dickinson cites Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577
(2009), which itself cites Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), and rejects full
Chevron deference for an agency's determination of pre-emption. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 57677. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. and MCI stand for the proposition that if the
agency attempts to make an avulsive change, no Chevron deference applies. See Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 121; MCI, 512 U.S. at 225-26.
128. Dickinson, supra note 127, at 673 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947)).
129. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002) ("[D]efining the proper scope of the
federal power ... does not involve a 'presumption against pre-emption,' as New York
argues, but rather requires us to be certain that Congress has conferred authority on the
agency.").
130. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (2006).
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Chevron analysis of making certain that Congress did in fact confer
authority over transmission planning to the extent that FERC claims
it.' 3 ' Because of the FPA's clear delegation, the situation here is
arguably quite different from other cases where the courts have been
unsure of Congress's intent and have been willing to apply the
presumption against preemption."'
The argument that Order 1000 should be remanded for being a
fundamental change to the statutory scheme (called Chevron Step
Zero) under MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T'"3 and FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. is not likely to succeed
because the "change" FERC is making is not fundamental.'3 1 In MCI,
the Supreme Court remanded an FCC Order that interpreted the
Communications Act of 1934, which required rate regulation through
tariffs, in a way that would have allowed non-dominant long distance
carriers to omit filing rate tariffs.3 6 The Court in Brown &
Williamson noted that over the years, both congressional language
and the FDA itself had agreed that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act gave no power to the FDA to regulate tobacco products.'3 7
Hence, the FDA's assertion of authority was ruled a reinterpretation
of the statute fundamentally inconsistent with what Congress had
intended.13 1
In Order 1000, FERC claims authority to mandate regional
transmission planning under its FPA section 206 grant to set the just
and reasonable rates and practices in interstate transmission by order
when unjust or discriminatory rates or practices are found."'
However, FPA section 206 is not the only statutory measure bearing
on FERC's authority in this regard. FERC's authority may be
tempered by FPA section 202(a)'s language, which empowers FERC
"to divide the country into regional districts for the voluntary
interconnection and coordination of facilities for the generation,
131. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 18.
132. See id.; Dickinson, supra note 127, at 687 ("Where Congress expressly indicates an
intent to preempt all state law that poses an obstacle to a particular statutory objective, for
instance, it intentionally leaves the scope of preemption vague. Under such circumstances,
the grant of rulemaking authority to the administering agency indicates a desire to have
that gap filled by the agency.").
133. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
134. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
135. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
136. MCI, 512 U.S. at 234.
137. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126, 133.
138. Id. at 160.
139. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,844-45 (Aug. 11, 2011)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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transmission, and sale of electric energy."1 This language suggests
that there is some type of transmission coordination between
geographical "districts" that must be voluntary. Opponents might
argue that FERC is trying to make a fundamental change from the
voluntary transmission coordination scheme in place under Order
2000 and permitted by FPA section 202(a)'s "voluntary
interconnection and coordination" language, to a mandatory scheme
of coordination of regional planning under Order 1000.
Unlike in MCI and Brown & Williamson, FERC's interpretation
of the FPA may likely be characterized as the continuation of reforms
in transmission policy under FPA section 206 that courts have
consistently upheld. 4 1 For example, the Supreme Court in New York
v. FERC unanimously upheld FERC Order 888, which mandated
wholesale market-wide open access transmission under FPA section
206.142 FPA section 202(a) does not state that FERC may only engage
in voluntary activity regarding transmission planning, as that section
"does not mention planning, and nothing in it can be read as
43
impliedly establishing limits on the Commission's jurisdiction."' The
FPA section 202(a) term "coordination" could instead refer to the
coordination of the real-time operation of facilities to supply
power," which in practice is distinguishable from "the planning
process for the identification of transmission facilities" at issue in
Order 1000.145 The first represents the coordination between
companies to reliably provide electric power on a daily basis, and the
second represents long-range planning and cost allocation of
transmission lines." Therefore, FERC's interpretation seems not to
exhibit the same change from a regulatory regime to a deregulatory
regime as in MCI, and unlike in Brown & Williamson, there is no
140. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2006).
141. See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002).
142. See id. at 5, 28. Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy concurred in the part
discussed here and dissented to the part deferring to FERC's decision not to examine
further whether the FPA required public utilities to unbundle their transmission services.
Id. at 28, 30-34 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). FERC Order 890's
implementation of system-wide adjustments to its open access transmission tariff that
required more involved transmission planning processes went legally unchallenged as a
valid exercise of FERC authority under FPA § 206. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 49,846.
143. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,860.
144. Id. at 49,860-61.
145. Id.
146. For example, although many utilities planned their own transmission systems,
electric companies have long coordinated their operations to provide reliability and lower
costs to customers. See, e.g., Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1160-61
(D.C. Cir, 1979).
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catalogue of congressional and agency statements that transmission
planning is outside of FERC's jurisdiction. Order 1000 should provide
no real opportunity to secure a Chevron Step Zero analysis.
B.

Chevron Step One: Congress Has Not Directly Spoken to the
Precise Question at Issue
Under Chevron, a reviewing court evaluating whether a formal
agency rulemaking such as Order 1000 is within the statutory powers
granted by Congress first examines whether "Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue;" 7 "[i]f the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter" (Chevron Step One).'4 8
However, "[i]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute"
(Chevron Step Two).' 9 In interpreting the statute, the court will look
to the traditional tools of statutory construction, s0 which include
statutory text and the legislative history.''
The prospects for opponents of Order 1000 at Chevron Step
One'15are
not particularly strong, due to the unspecific statutory
language and the recent FERC-supportive Supreme Court decision in
New York v. FERC.I This Comment argues that the three aspects of
the precise question at issue are: (1) whether FERC's authority under
FPA section 206 to fix by order just and reasonable rates and
practices supports mandating regional transmission planning; (2)
whether FPA section 202(a) requires a reform for regional
transmission planning and cost allocation to be voluntary; and (3)
whether FERC is limited from asserting the authority to mandate
processes for transmission planning and cost allocations by the
congressional reservation of power to the states over generation,
siting, sales of electricity at retail, and associated services under FPA
section 201(a) or over electric sales at retail under FPA section
201(b).
147. Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 843.
150. Id. at 843 n.9.
151. Cf Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("Analysis of legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool of statutory
construction. There is no reason why we must confine ourselves to, or begin our analysis
with, the statutory text if other tools of statutory construction provide better evidence of
congressional intent with respect to the precise point at issue.").
152. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
153. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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Before proceeding, this Comment will briefly observe how the
precedent pronouncing Congress's intention may be used in statutory
construction under a Chevron analysis. For the D.C. Circuit, likely to
be reviewing Order 1000, only Supreme Court precedent and D.C.
Circuit decisions that declare the relevant statutory construction to be
unambiguous with regards to the matter at issue can serve as binding
precedent on statutory interpretation.' 54 Otherwise, National Cable &
5
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, Inc.1
holds that when conducting a formal agency action, an agency is free
to change its interpretation of the statute and courts must apply
Chevron deference to that new interpretation.1 6
In support of its authority for Order 1000 under FPA section 206,
FERC will be able to draw on a long list of transmission reforms
permitted by courts (and implicitly by Congress)."' Against this list,
opponents will likely contend that FPA section 206 authority is
limited by a line of cases holding that some actions are too far
removed from a practice affecting a wholesale or unbundled
transmission rate to fall under section 206 authority.' In a 2004 case,
California Independent System Operator Corp. v. FERCise
("CAISO"), the D.C. Circuit held at Chevron Step One that in FPA
section 206, Congress had clearly precluded FERC from altering the
structure of the California ISO's corporate governance by replacing
its board of directors."s After citing FERC decisions and case law
154. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982-83 (2005) (holding that a reviewing court may not depend on its own prior
construction of an ambiguous statutory grant as trumping a conflicting agency
construction unless the reviewing court can cite "judicial precedent holding that the
statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no
gap for the agency to fill."). In Brand X Internet, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had held that a prior Ninth Circuit panel's construction of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 was entitled to stare decisis treatment given that the prior
panel had held its interpretation was the best reading of the statute. Id. at 969. The
Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the Ninth Circuit's prior holding had neither
declared that the prior holding was "the only permissible reading" nor was required
unambiguously by the Communications Act, and held that "the Ninth Circuit erred in
refusing to apply Chevron." Id.

155. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
156. Id. at 982-83.
157. See supra Part I.B.
158. See, e.g., NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669-71 (1976) (holding in part that
FPC/FERC's charge to ensure just and reasonable rates does not include practices too far
removed from those affecting a rate).
159. 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
160. CAISO, 372 F.3d at 404. ISOs carry out the transmission and related services for
all users of a transmission system. Id. at 397. The ISO therefore replaces the "conduct of
such services by the system owners-that is, the integrated electric utilities whose market
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limiting the scope of the word "practice" in the context of FERC's
wholesale or unbundled transmission rate-making power,16 ' the court
held that FERC's FPA section 206 authority was "limited to those
methods or ways of doing things on the part of the utility that directly
affect the rate or are closely related to the rate, not all those remote
things beyond the rate structure that might in some sense indirectly or
ultimately do so."' 62
On the merits, a reviewing court will likely conclude that
Congress did not speak to the precise question at issue and FERC's
action will be found to be related to a practice affecting rates closely
enough to fall within FERC's FPA section 206 authority. First, the
statutory language of FPA section 206 is ambiguous and has been
interpreted expansively.' 63 The legislative history of FPA section 206
seems unhelpful because, as the Supreme Court has noted, Congress
at the time of the passage of the FPA did not imagine the functional
separation of transmission from generation." Thus, it is difficult to

power FERC was attempting to control by encouraging the creation and operation of the
ISOs." Id. As such, its functions are very similar to an RTO with respect to transmission
planning and services.
161. Id. at 402-03. This section cited various precedent interpreting the Interstate
Commerce Commission's statutes on which the Federal Power Act, including section 206,
was based. The court related, for example, that the Interstate Commerce Commission
could not regulate the number of men to be employed by crews as a "practice," Mo. Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 257 (1931), nor could a "practice" encompass
regulation outside the "terms of service." United States v. Pa. R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 208, 22833 (1916). The CAISO court continued by citing FERC's past interpretations of its
authority under a similar provision of the Natural Gas Act, when FERC defined a
"practice ... affecting [a] rate" as a "consistent and predicable course of conduct
of the supplier that affects [the utilities'] financial relationship with the consumer."
Mich. Wisc. PipelineCo., 34 F.P.C. 621,626 (Aug. 30, 1965). See also Transwestern
Pipeline Co., 26 F.E.R.C. 1 63,008 (Jan. 20, 1984) (describing the Michigan
Wisconsin Pipeline Co. construction as the [FERC's] "full[ ] articulat[ion]" of the
meaning of the statutory language.).
CAISO, 372 F.3d at 403. FERC often has applied precedent from gas regulation to electric
regulation questions to inform its reasoning. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
FERC, 347 F.3d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
162. CAISO, 372 F.3d at 403.
163. See supra Part I.B.
164. Cf New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 21-24 (2002) (discussing how the legislative
history of the FPA, specifically section 201(a) and inferentially section 206 as the
foundation for Order No. 888, did not preclude upholding Order 888). Given that
Congress did not imagine unbundled transmission services, it is not surprising that
Congress might not have clearly spoken to the precise question at issue with regards to
whether FPA section 206's just and reasonable rates standard could support mandating
regional transmission planning. Cf id. (noting that Congress could not have foreseen the
changes occurring in the electric power industry). The legislative history of FPA § 202(a),
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credit the legislative history with any pronouncement about how FPA
section 206 might apply to practices affecting an ISO's provision of
unbundled transmission services, although bundled retail services
regulated by the states have not been functionally separated so New
York's findings about legislative history do not necessarily extend to
bundled retail service. A reviewing court will probably distinguish
FERC's action in Order 1000 from FERC's effort to change the board
of directors in CAISO because "[i]t is through the transmission
planning process that public utility transmission providers determine
which transmission facilities will more efficiently or cost-effectively
meet the needs of the region, the development of which directly
impacts the rates, terms and conditions of jurisdictional service." 165
Although CAISO is good persuasive authority from the D.C. Circuit
invalidating FERC action at Chevron Step One, FERC should be
successful in distinguishing it given transmission planning's close
impacts on transmission construction decisions and therefore the
rates to be charged consumers.16 1
The second aspect is whether Congress spoke to the precise
question at issue when it enacted FPA section 202(a) and directed
that FERC "divide the country into regional districts for the
voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the
167
generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy." When read in
context, this section could be read to limit FERC authority under
FPA section 206 by delineating some activities related to
68
coordination of transmission that must be voluntary. Opponents
will likely argue to the court that the language of FPA section 202(a)
means that Congress spoke directly to the issue that "coordination of
facilities for ... transmission" must be voluntary, and therefore that

transmission planning must be voluntary. In addition to the statutory
text, opponents can look to legislative history, which discusses the
"enlightened self-interest," as opposed to mandate, that will lead
utilities to "planned coordination." 69

discussed infra note 176 and accompanying text, is potentially more applicable, but even it
is ambiguous.
165. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,862 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
166. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.

167. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2006).

168. See North Carolina Utilities Commission, supra note 21, at 6-7.
169. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (citing S. REP.
NO. 621, at 49 (1935)).
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In interpreting FPA section 202(a), opponents will also rely on
Central Iowa Power Cooperative v. FERC,7 o where a party in a
formal adjudication sought to have FERC mandate that power pool
participants draw up plans for larger generation units and engage in
single system planning and electricity dispatch."' The court ruled that
FERC did not have authority to mandate any specific level of power
pooling, given "the expressly voluntary nature of coordination under
section 202(a)." 7 2 Perhaps most troublesome for FERC is the court's
dicta: "Notwithstanding the desirability of coordination of electric
systems, however, Congress decided to make such coordination
voluntary .... Congress was convinced that 'enlightened self-interest'

would lead utilities to engage voluntarily in power planning
arrangements, and it was not willing to mandate that they do so."7
Opponents of Order 1000 will argue that Central Iowa's holding
shows that transmission planning was included in the "coordination"
that must be voluntary, and therefore that Congress spoke to the

precise question at issue.174
As with the FPA section 206 question, FERC should also be able
to show that Congress did not speak precisely to the aspect of the
question of whether FPA section 202(a) limits its authority to
promulgate mandatory regional transmission planning processes.s1 5
There are quite a few reasons why FERC will prevail, first among
those being that the statutory language of FPA section 202(a) is
ambiguous regarding the long-range transmission planning Order
1000 mandates."1 6 From the statutory language, it is not clear what the
term "coordination" encompasses, and FPA section 202(a) does not
mention "planning" a single time.' 77 Second, the legislative history
170. 606 F. 2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
171. Id. at 1166. Power pooling is a practice whereby utilities join in an agreement to
cooperate in the provision of certain services, but the variation between arrangements is
vast. Cf id. at 1161 (describing the particular arrangement of the power pool at issue in
this case but noting some of the characteristics of other power pools that the arrangement
here did not possess).
172. Id. at 1168.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. See, e.g., North Carolina Utilities Commission, supra note 21, at 6-7.
175. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
176. In Order 1000-A, FERC on rehearing noted that section 202(a) was ambiguous
and stated that it had provided a reasonable interpretation of the statute. FERC Order
1000-A, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184,32,206 (May 31,2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
177. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,860 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). In Order 1000-A, FERC clarified that planning an activity and
engaging in an activity were two different things, analogizing planning for coordination
and "coordination" to planning a trip and taking a trip. FERC Order No. 1000-A, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 32,206.
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does not speak to the question at issue, but instead discusses the
"enlightened self-interest" that will lead utilities to "planned
coordination."1 8 Third, Central Iowa is not binding precedent under
Brand X Internet because the Court did not hold that FPA section
202(a) unambiguously required voluntariness with respect to regional
transmission planning."' This ambiguity means that FERC may now
act based on its new construction of the statute and will receive
Chevron deference." Fourth, Central Iowa's relevance at all is
questionable, given that it is not clear whether the court in Central
Iowa was thinking about only operational planning or whether it
included long-range planning for transmission. Fifth, even assuming
that the court in Central Iowa was considering transmission planning
within its definition of "coordination," CentralIowa is not particularly
persuasive precedent; it is a dated decision issued prior to Chevron.8 2
Taking these reasons into account, and given FERC's dicta suggesting
that a broad interpretation should be applied to FERC's authority
over ensuring just and reasonable practices affecting wholesale or
unbundled transmission rates, a reviewing court is unlikely to reverse
FERC at Chevron Step One on these grounds.
The third aspect of Congress's intent is whether jurisdiction was
reserved to the states under the FPA for intrastate activities and retail
sales. This aspect of Congress's intent is a closer question than the
others. FPA section 201(a) reserved to the states the powers under
178. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (citing S. REP.
NO. 621, at 49 (1935)).
179. See Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
180. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982-83 (2005).
181. See Cent. Iowa, 606 F.2d at 1166-68.
182. See generally id. at 1168 (Central Iowa was decided in 1979, prior to the Supreme
Court's Chevron decision). To reach the conclusion that FERC was not required to
mandate certain power pool conditions, the Central Iowa court applied a version of the
standard of review of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), asking whether FERC
had made "an informed and reasoned decision consistent with congressional purposes."
Cent. Iowa, 606 F.2d at 1167. Central Iowa has been cited post-Chevron in the text of a

case for the provision at issue only once by the D.C. Circuit, and that decision did not
elaborate on the ambiguous language relating to the extent of the term "coordination" at
issue here. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In Atlantic
City, the court held in pertinent part that FERC could not require a certain condition on a
petitioner separating itself from an ISO, which as in Central Iowa could be construed to
relate to the coordination of operations for the ISO, as opposed to transmission planning.
Id. The Atlantic City court did not expand upon the nature of "coordination" in support of
petitioners, instead simply quoting Central Iowa's statement that "[gliven the expressly
voluntary nature of coordination under section 202(a), the Commission could not have
mandated adoption of the [coordination] Agreement." Id. (quoting Cent. Iowa, 606 F.2d at
1167-68).
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their jurisdiction at the time of the passage of the FPA,8 a which
included generation and distribution, as well as primary siting
authority.1 14 FPA section 201(b)(1) sets out that federal regulation
"shall not apply to any other [non-wholesale] sale of electric energy,"
i.e. retail sales." FPA section 201(a) and (b) therefore provide two
limits to FPA section 206.186

As to the first of these limits, FERC's interpretation of the
statute could conflict with FPA section 201(a) based either on the
planning process itself or on cost allocation. In both of these similar
potential FPA section 201(a) conflicts, the regional planning process
could essentially determine available transmission siting or cost
allocation options for state utility commissioners. State
commissioners' options would be limited to a choice resembling an up
or down vote on a pre-planned or cost pre-allocated transmission
plan. FERC would, through its approved regional transmission
processes, exercise "indirect regulation of . . . siting, construction,

permitting, and resource planning decisions"---exactly the powers
reserved to the states under FPA section 201(a), in contravention of
the statute.'87 FERC has not been given statutory authority to
mandate generation or transmission siting,'88 and courts have held

183. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(1) (2006).
184. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 67 (noting that in
some states, authority is vested in a single state agency, while in others, states have
allowed local governments to exercise control).
185. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).
186. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 67.
187. FERC Order No. 1000-A, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184, 32,203, 32,214-15 (May 31, 2012)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). Although utilities certainly may build their infrastructure
without cost recovery, they must recover costs so their owners, whether investors or the
public, will receive the returns needed to finance necessary capital and operating
expenditures. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 174. As one commenter notes, the
choice between going forward with a project that will not receive cost recovery or
conforming to the product of a FERC-endorsed regional planning process is really no
choice at all. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 43 (citing Assoc. Gas Distribs. v.
FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen a condemned man is given the choice
between the noose and the firing squad, we do not ordinarily say that he has 'voluntarily'
chosen to be hanged.")).
188. See Southeastern Utilities, supra note 21, at 43 ("In this regard, [Order 1000] is

silent regarding the preemptive effect of its regional cost allocation decisions upon retail
rate payers-if (for example) they are going to be forced to pay for a non-incumbent's
transmission line chosen through the FERC-regulated regional transmission planning
process, then it would seem difficult (if not imprudent) for the incumbent owner to pursue
an alternative project, meaning that the FERC-regulated regional transmission planning

process would have effectively made the substantive transmission planning decision due to
its preemptive effect on retail rates.").
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that FERC is not allowed to "[do] indirectly what it cannot do
directly."18

This argument's weaknesses result from an overgenerous
construction of state authority at the time of the passage of the FPA.
Even leaving aside the explicit FPA grant to FERC over "the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,"190 the
fundamental problem with opponents' FPA section 201(a) argument
is that the states never explicitly regulated interstate transmission
planning and therefore that jurisdiction could not be reserved to the
states on the passage of the FPA Part II in 1935.191 States regulated
generation and transmission siting, but utilities themselves planned
their transmission facilities to serve their geographic area and built to
the extent they could receive cost recovery from the states.19 2 States
possessed some indirect authority over transmission planning through
their approval for the utilities' cost recovery when the vertically
integrated utilities offered bundled services for generation,
transmission, and distribution. 9 3 The Supreme Court has commented
on this indirect authority, guarded by FPA section 201(a). It has said
that FPA section 201(a) is a mere policy declaration and cannot
prevail against a clear statutory grant to the contrary, such as the one
over wholesale and unbundled transmission in interstate commerce.194
Although it is true that FERC did not in the past assert authority over
transmission planning, this past non-assertion does not mean the
states possessed the authority, or that FERC cannot now assert it.195
The second argument that Order 1000 is incompatible with the
reservation of jurisdiction to the states under the FPA is that FERC is
189. See, e.g., Towns of Concord, Norwood, and Wellesley, Mass. v. FERC, 955 F.2d
67, 71 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (commenting that the rationale of the filed rate doctrine, which
is to prohibit a regulated entity from charging for services other than those approved by
the regulatory Commission, also meant that the Commission could not adjust the entities
rates retroactively-in essence ensuring that FERC is prohibited "from doing indirectly
what it cannot do directly" (quoting Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 898 F.2d 809, 810
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Williams, J., concurring) (per curiam))). In Towns of Concord, the D.C.
Circuit held that FERC did not violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking because the
statute at issue gave FERC discretionary power to order refunds for utility overcharging.
Id. at 72.
190. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2002) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)
(2000)).
191. See supra Part I.A.
192. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
194. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 22.
195. Cf. id. at 20-21 (describing how the grant of statutory authority under the FPA is
in no way limited by the specific facts and issues of the United States Supreme Court case
that gave rise to passage of the FPA in 1935).
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indirectly influencing the conditions of retail sales, in violation of
FPA section 201(b)(1). By requiring regional cost allocation schemes,
FERC may cause costs to be allocated to retail ratepayers regardless
of state commissions' authority in this area. States will roundly
protest any impact on retail sales of this kind, and this issue is the
closest jurisdictional question. Although FERC has never asserted all
of its potential jurisdiction over transmission in interstate commerce,
the states' argument is weakened by the fact that the FPA may grant
FERC this authority, and a court has never held that FERC could not
exercise it because of its indirect impact on sales at retail.1 9 In New
York v. FERC, the majority of the Court opined that this question
might be a difficult jurisdictional one,197 but they also stated that "the
FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions,
without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or
directly to a consumer."198 Additionally, three Justices, all of whom
remain on the Court, partially dissented on the grounds that they
believed the majority did not construe FERC's jurisdiction
expansively enough. 199 They stated that FERC's jurisdiction must
extend to all interstate transmission, no matter what type of sale is at
issue. 21 The next year, in Detroit Edison Co. v. FERC,20 1 the D.C.
Circuit said, "In sum, FERC has jurisdiction over all interstate
transmission service and over all wholesale service." 202
196. New York v. FERC held that FERC's decision to treat bundled retail sales,
including the transmission aspect of those sales, as falling under state jurisdiction was a
permissible policy choice entitled to deference. Id. at 5, 15. Nevertheless, under Brand X
Internet, FERC's "new" construction of its statutory grant in FPA section 206 to remedy
unjust and discriminatory rates in transmission in interstate commerce is also entitled to
deference. See supra note 155-56 and accompanying text.
197. New York v. FERC,535 U.S. at 27. The Court stated, "It is obvious that a federal
order claiming jurisdiction over all retail transmissions would have even greater
implications for the States' regulation of retail sales-a state regulatory power recognized
by the same statutory provision that authorizes FERC's transmission jurisdiction." Id. at
28 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000)); cf Conn. Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515,
529-31 (1945) (interpreting the FPA and its legislative history to conclude that the
reservation to state power in the FPA, although more general than the federal grant over
interstate transmission, retained significance). More recently, a FERC white paper
associated with the SMD proceeding identified that an assertion of authority over the
transmission component of bundled retail service could entail "unintended issues." FERC,
WHITE
PAPER:
WHOLESALE
POWER
MARKET
PLATFORM
4-5
(2003),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/StandardMktdsgn/FERC_-Whitepaper_042803.pdf.
198. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 20.
199. Id. at 29 (Thomas, J., concurring & dissenting in part).
200. Id. ("FERC has jurisdiction over all interstate transmission, regardless of the type
of transaction with which it is associated.").
201. 334 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
202. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). In Detroit Edison, the D.C. Circuit held that FERC
could not assert jurisdiction over an unbundled retail service that FERC had not
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The interstate transmission regulation in which FERC engages
can, to a greater or lesser extent, affect sales terms to the ultimate
retail ratepayers and thus can indirectly preempt aspects of state
commission jurisdiction. Because FERC has never asserted
regulatory authority over unbundled retail transmissions, a reviewing
court will have to decide whether Congress spoke clearly to preclude
FERC from having the authority to mandate transmission planningreforms designed to serve the wholesale market-that could affect
unbundled retail transmission rates. That Order 1000's planning
processes are focused on just and reasonable wholesale rates makes it
more likely that a court would conclude that Congress has not spoken
clearly against FERC's authority. And, given the recent trend in the
industry and corresponding trend toward more permissive readings of
FERC's authority in the case law, this indirect effect on retail sales is
probably not enough to prevail.
That FERC Order 1000 is not too far removed from a practice
affecting wholesale rates, while still permitting voluntary coordination
for operations and not exceeding FERC's authority with respect to
state jurisdiction, is reconcilable. As long as FERC's FPA section 206
authority may be construed broadly enough to enable it to mandate
market-wide transmission planning, i.e. not limited as a practice too
far removed from rates or needing to be voluntary, FERC may
exercise its longstanding authority over transmission in interstate
commerce. Further, such authority is not limited to only wholesale
sales. FERC has historically forborn from asserting its full authority
over interstate transmission, but at a time when FERC would like to
shepherd the interstate transmission system to support wholesale
markets, it may choose to assert not-yet-asserted regulatory powers.
Chevron Step Two: Order1000's Reading of FPA Section 206 Is a
Reasonable Interpretationof the Statute
Once Order 1000 survives the first step of the Chevron analysis,
FERC's interpretation will be evaluated under the Chevron Step Two
reasonableness standard.2 03 As is the usual case with Chevron Step
Two inquiries, FERC's construction of the FPA will be held a
permissible construction of the statute. FERC can reason that,
C.

determined was "FERC-jurisdictional" rather than being a local distribution facility-and
thus subject to state control-as defined in Order 888. Id. at 54. This holding applies to a
direct assertion over sales at retail, which is not the interstate transmission planning to
support wholesale markets reform proposed under Order 1000.
203. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11
(1984).
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because of the lack of regional planning and cost allocation, some
public utility transmission providers are not proceeding with
construction of transmission that could lead to more just and
reasonable rates. In this context, a nationwide requirement of
regional transmission planning processes fulfills Step Two's
undemanding criteria of being a merely reasonable response. That
FERC's reasoning would succeed is made more likely by the broad
interpretation the Supreme Court gave FPA section 206 in New York
v. FERC.2" Recall that it unanimously upheld FERC's authority to
mandate open access transmission for wholesale purposes under the
statute as transmission under FPA section 206, and that three sitting
Justices stated that FERC must have jurisdiction over transmissions
in bundled retail service.205
This assertion of authority to mandate transmission planning is
indeed new, and it will have important effects. The states and utilities
opposed to Order 1000 are correct in their claim that this federal
assertion will affect utilities' and states' transmission and generation
decisions, and it will likely raise some utilities' and some consumers'
costs.206 For FERC, this assertion of authority, and even the collateral
distribution of costs, is precisely the point. In exercising its FPA
section 206 authority, FERC wanted to support competitive
wholesale markets by encouraging the construction of additional
transmission.2 ' FERC also believed that the public utility
transmission providers had the latitude to avoid sufficiently building
204. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 2-3.
205. Id. at 28-29 (Thomas, J., concurring & dissenting in part) (concurring in the
holding that the FPA supports allowing FERC to mandate open access transmission).
206. By definition, if the regional planning and cost allocation favors some utilities'
plans by requiring transmission lines to be built where they otherwise would not be, some
party will bear an increase in costs. Cf Scott Hempling, Exec. Dir., Nat'I Regulatory
Research Inst., Interconnection Animus: Do Regulatory Procedures Create a "Tragedy of
the Commons"? Address to the Forum, "New Challenges in Siting Transmission Lines,"
sponsored by the Center for Energy Economics, University of Texas at Austin and The
Terra Group 4 (Jan. 29, 2009), http://scotthemplinglaw.comfiles/pdf/ppr-nnri-trans
interconnectionanimus0l10.pdf (querying why some states that benefit from lower rates
by virtue of geographically serendipitous proximity to inexpensive energy sources insist on
keeping those rates so low when their assumption of a greater portion of improvement
costs would produce benefits outweighing the costs) [hereinafter Hempling Speech].
207. Cf NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., FERC's ORDER 1000 SETS
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION POLICY: LANDMARK, LAND MINE, OR BOTH? 7 (Aug. 11,
2011), http://nrri.org/pubs/seminars/FERC_1000_ConferenceManual.pdf
("Why does
FERC feel it needs to promise that its [Order 1000 regional planning] processes won't
affect state-level planning when the entire purpose, a proper purpose aimed at getting
consumers the benefits of greater efficiencies, is to do just that?").
208. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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out transmission, or even to discriminate in construction of
transmission facilities so as not to effectively serve the potential
electric generation competitors that sought to add robustness to the
wholesale market. 2m At the same time, FERC believes that this state
of affairs has been too slow to change.2"o FERC's assertion of
authority is premised on its belief that despite the protests, overall the
rates to consumers will be more "just and reasonable" as a result of
Order 1000.211
Should the Order be found to be within FERC's statutory
powers and to not be arbitrary and capricious, the public's general
hope must be that the overall benefits in terms of reliability, lower
cost of wholesale electricity, and more usage of renewables in fact
outweigh the costs. 2 12 One expert has suggested a method for Order
1000 to allow states (and utilities) a better opportunity to ensure that
these goals are met.213 He argues that a state's policy preferences
could be so served if a state commission specifically ensures that a
state-regulated public utility transmission provider works to have
them considered in the FERC regional planning process.214 FERC
Order 1000 might in fact benefit states that have utilities with
electricity supply needs that depend on regional cooperation. 2 15 It is
true that one state or utility might very well end up paying some
portion of the monetary cost for benefits to another state-as well as
assuming environmental, ambient, and economic development
consequences.216 But if in the aggregate Order 1000 offers benefits,
then perhaps the best way to seize those benefits is to attempt to
bring the interested parties into the decision-making early in the
process and to try to mitigate the negative impacts to the extent
209. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 391-92.
210. Cf FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,849 ("The Commission stated its
intention was... to address remaining deficiencies in transmission planning and cost
allocation processes so that the transmission grid can better support wholesale power
markets and thereby ensure that Commission-jurisdictional services are provided at
rates ... that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.").
211. See id. at 49,845.
212. See generally Hempling Speech, supra note 206 (arguing that in transmission
disputes, our society overemphasizes tangible costs, such as the construction impacts of
transmission lines, and underemphasizes the intangible benefits of long-term economic
development and electric reliability, among others).
213. See NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., supra note 207, at 2.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Coalition for Fair Transmission, supra note 6, at 5 ("[States and public
utilities] should not be involuntarily assigned costs for projects selected in a regional
transmission plan for which they have no need, even if there is some incidental,
amorphous 'benefit' ascribed by those seeking broad cost socialization.").
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possible. 17 Giving parties a meaningful ability to examine
opportunities for benefits constructively should reduce the opposition
and acrimony that characterizes many transmission projects.
There is, however, a hole in this state of affairs. It is the
mechanism by which the consumer, environmental, landowner, and
local economic development interests may actually inform themselves
and contribute to the transmission planning process. Addressing this
representation problem could improve the final transmission
decisions overall, while potentially mitigating the most negative
effects of transmission construction.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF MANDATED REGIONAL
PLANNING AND A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST

A.

The Lingering Public InterestRepresentationProblem, Potentially
Exacerbatedby FERC Order 1000
As it stands now, some of the very policies that FERC's Order
1000 is designed to serve may be critically shortchanged by the
transmission planning process embodied in FERC's orders.218 The
underlying goal of FERC policies is to serve the public interest, 219
which FERC hopes to do in part by encouraging wholesale markets
that provide just and reasonable, i.e. lower, rates.220 Just and
reasonable rates are surely a central part of the public interest in the
context of utility regulation, but the public interest is broader and
more multifaceted than rates alone, a proposition that courts have
upheld.2 2 In this discussion, this Comment adopts a definition of
217. See Hempling Speech, supra note 206, passim.
218. Despite FERC's public interest-minded goals of providing "just and reasonable
rates" that are not "unduly discriminatory or preferential," FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed.
Reg. 49,842, 49,845 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35), observers have raised
numerous concerns about Order 1000. See, e.g., NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST.,
supra note 207, at 8 (raising questions about how little funding Order 1000 provides for
public interest groups and other stakeholders to recoup the costs they incur during the
planning process); see also Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 578 (discussing the
difficulties in securing the public interest for RTO governance).
219. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006).
220. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,845; Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra
note 23, at 578 ("In the broadest sense, the RTO is accountable to each and every citizen
for ensuring that they receive just and reasonable rates.").
221. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 581-82 (noting that the public
interest in RTO contexts is often "extremely difficult to particularize" because
"stakeholders' interests diverge dramatically" given the wide array of customers,
geographic diversity, and temporal interests). For an example of how courts have
interpreted FERC's ability to serve the public interest through its specifically enumerated
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"public interest" as shorthand for the interest of parties who may
have an interest in transmission outcomes but could have trouble
participating meaningfully in a transmission planning process. This
group includes consumers, landowners, land protection groups, local
economic development groups, and small-scale renewable energy
advocates.2 22 These groups stand in contrast to what are called
"market participants" 2n--entities such as utilities, trade groups,
merchant providers, and other RTO insiders, who traditionally have
had both an interest in the outcome and the resources to fully
integrate into the process. Order 1000's new and uncertain
institutional structure exacerbates the difference in sophistication that
already exists between public interest groups and the market
participants that might be able to more adroitly navigate the system.

authority, see generally NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 665 (1976) (holding that the FPC/FERC
could not stretch its focus on the public interest into a broad mandate for combating racial
discrimination, but also recognizing that FERC was fully empowered to account for such
discriminatory practices in its decision-making if it determined that these practices might
impair its mission of providing reliable service at "just and reasonable rates"). FERC may
take into account practices that affect providing reliable service at just and reasonable
rates. First, the equity of cost allocation, in which these groups might like a say, is directly
related to rates. Second, unlike the question of whether the FPA public interest directive
included eradicating discrimination, at issue in NAACP, the interests of the consumers,
landowners, land protection groups, local economic development groups, and small-scale
renewable energy advocates directly bear on the substantive transmission planning
decisions themselves. The substantive planning decisions directly affect rates and practices
affecting rates.
222. Defining "public interest" precisely is a quest that could fill many tomes. In one
sense, "public interest" includes the entire public, which would encompass FERC's point
of view, utilities and their shareholders, and the national economy, in addition to the
consumers, landowners, environmental advocates, citizens' groups, and small-scale clean
energy advocates. This Comment uses "public interest" as a shorthand for groups that are
not market participants because these groups' lack of resources and monetary interest is a
significant difference in their ability to participate and their interest in participation. As
Mr. Hempling counsels, however, the concept of the public interest should not be
narrowed too much, as the sacrifices of some are required or society will be deprived of
any net benefits of transmission construction. See Hempling Speech, supra note 206, at 4.
For discussion of the public interest standard in utility regulation and its relation to
environmental goals, see generally Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental
Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) (discussing state public

utility commissions and environmental considerations) and Jeremy Knee, Rational
Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the "Public Interest", 113 W. VA. L.

739 (2011) (discussing why, although FERC does not centrally consider
environmental decision-making, such decision-making should be part of the public interest
REV.

standard). See also generally JIM RossI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW

(2005) (contending regulatory compact is no longer only about consumer protection).
223. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 562 (differentiating market
participants from other stakeholders who do not possess a commercial stake in the RTO
process).
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The public interest was already a concern prior to the issuance of
Order 1000 because the "complicated, technical, and expensive
structure" of infrastructure and energy planning, including
transmission planning, gave rise to a public interest representation
problem.224 For any person or entity that would hope to influence the
process, participating in transmission planning has extremely high
"monitoring costs," including technical understanding and time.2 2
Only entities with large amounts of resources can easily afford these
costs. 226 Michael Dworkin and Rachel Goldwasser spoke to this
224. Id. at 583; see also, e.g., Motion of Indicated Joint PJM State Consumer Advocate
Agencies to Propose Apportionment of Monies in PJM Fund and Proposal at 3, FERC
Docket No. IN12-7-000 (July 10, 2012) [hereinafter CAPS Proposal] (proposing creation
of a regional consumer advocate in the PJM RTO process). FERC eventually approved
this proposal. See generally Order Confirming Rulings from the Oct. 4, 2012 Oral
Argument, FERC Docket No. IN12-7-000 (Oct. 10, 2012). The CAPS Proposal describes
the need for participation of consumer interest, noting that FERC itself discussed this
need in its order accepting the compliance filing in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 133
FERC 1 61,071, 1 38 (2010) [hereinafter PJM Interconnection Compliance Order]. CAPS
Proposal, supra, at 5-6. There, FERC recognized that
[E]xisting RTO/ISO stakeholder and board processes present resource
challenges for certain stakeholders, including many consumer
advocates, and may present barriers to the full, open participation of
stakeholders in RTO/ISO governance matters. In light of such
concerns and consistent with our statement in Order No. 719 with
respect to the ongoing responsiveness criterion, RTOs/ISOs, including
PJM, should continually evaluate their governance policies and
stakeholder processes and consider how they may be improved. If
parties continue to have concerns in these areas that are not being
addressed, the Commission may revisit these issues. The Commission
will also continue to monitor these matters and take appropriate
action, as required.
Id.; see also Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 583-86 (describing the "technical
world of acronyms, complex engineering, and economics" that limits stakeholder
participation in RTO decisions).
225. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 584 (arguing that public interest groups
and individual energy users face "extremely high costs of participation in stakeholder
processes compared to potential benefits" (citing Michael Levine & Jennifer Forrence,
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167 (1990))); see also AM. PUB. POWER Ass'N, ON THE
GROUND: PUBLIC POWER UTILITY EXPERIENCES IN WHOLESALE ELECrRICITY
MARKETS 6, 12 (2007), http://www.publicpower.org/files/pdfs/ontheground.pdf (lamenting
the difficulty for consumers to become involved in the planning process).
226. See CAPS Proposal, supra note 224, at 7. The state public advocates proposing the
regional public advocate reform noted,
While there is some representation of large industrial customers, the vast majority
of customers in PJM, as well as their designated state Consumer Advocates, are
absent from most meetings; particularly at the lower-level committees where
proposals are first developed and participation is vital to influencing market rule
development. Consumer Advocate participation is often limited to higher-level
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problem in the context of RTO decision-making in general six years
ago, 227 and FERC itself has more recently acknowledged this need."
An RTO can serve as the region for FERC Order 1000, and with
several RTOs now over a decade old,229 the RTOs' relatively
"longstanding" institutional structure provides an anchor around
which to erect a public interest representation process. But FERC
Order 1000 requires all public utility transmission providers, including
those outside the established RTOs, to join a new region. For many
parts of the country, these new regions may only be manifested in the
filing in their FERC tariff or in voluntary processes between utilities
pursuant to Order 890. For the regions in geographical areas outside
of the RTO structure, the uncertain institutional structure of the
Order 1000 regional planning process makes the issues Dworkin and
Goldwasser raised even more important.
Given the technical nature of these planning processes, which are
not amenable to public interest participation, it is important to
address up front the argument made by some experts that the public
interest is best served by limiting the ability of parties opposed to
projects to slow those projects down.2 10 The argument certainly has
some merit, because for our society to reap the benefits of electricity,
trade, and communications systems, we must build the infrastructure
projects to support those systems. 231 However, to the extent that
FERC Order 1000 provides a net benefit to consumers from greater
efficiencies, this Comment takes the position that expending some
resources to ensure that the parties that could be affected can
participate is a price worth paying. According basic dignity to
members of our society who are impacted by these projects "mak[es]
232 And providing better public
[our] entire nation more civilized."
interest representation may even lead to better decisions and more
committee meetings, such as the Members Committee where proposals have
already been fully-formed and fully vetted.
Id.; see also Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 584 (describing monetary, expertise,
and time requirements for participation in RTOs).
227. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 584.
228. See PJM Interconnection Compliance Order, supra note 224, at 12 (FERC
compliance order noting public interest representation challenges).
229. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 17.

230. See, e.g., Hempling Speech, supra note 206, at 2.
231, Id.
232. Id. at 5. Although this quotation relates to how (independently of Order 1000)
some states have established low-income assistance programs to assist all citizens in
meeting their electrical and other basic needs, Hempling's broader point about generosity
applies equally to the issue of ensuring an opportunity for a modicum of participation in
transmission planning for less-sophisticated parties.
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beneficial outcomes over the longer term. Order 1000 itself embodies
those values,m even if the Order does not provide many resources to
facilitate the participation of public interest groups.2 When transmission planning happens at the individual utility
level, it can happen as part of a state transmission planning process, in
the context of integrated resource planning, or as part of final costrecovery decision-making. In these cases, there is a certain, if
attenuated, level of regulatory control by officials accountable to the
electorate.2 35 State regulators have influence in the final approval of
projects by vertically integrated public utility transmission providers
through the state integrated resource plans, transmission siting, and
state certificates of public convenience and necessity.2 6 Additionally,
state regulators and public advocates can potentially monitor utilitybased transmission planning processes and keep themselves apprised
of the situation more easily.237 Representatives of the state consumer
advocate can report back to the state public utilities commission or
the state legislature if something is amiss, and as the processes are
made up by parties regulated by the state public utilities commission,
the regulators can more directly influence the process.23 8
Furthermore, interested parties with fewer resources may be able to
more easily participate because of the geographic proximity to the
decision-makers.239 Lastly, when decision-making takes place in

233. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842,49,848 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing progress toward more "inclusive" planning that has "given
stakeholders the ability to participate," which should lead to better and more efficient
transmission planning decisions).
234. See, e.g., NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., supra note 207, at 8 (noting
that while FERC does not explicitly require public utility transmission providers to include
funding for public interest stakeholder participation in the planning process, "nothing in
this Final Rule precludes them from doing so").
235. This can be a very attenuated degree of political accountability, as the state
utilities commissioners are themselves likely appointed for multi-year terms by the
governor. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-10 (2011) (directing that North Carolina's utility
commissioners be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the General Assembly to
staggered six-year terms).
236. See supra Part I.A.

237. Telephone Interview with Gisele Rankin, supra note 99.
238. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-15(d) (2011) (providing wide-ranging powers to
the Public Staff, including "review[ing], investigat[ing], [and] mak[ing] appropriate
recommendations to the Commission," and "intervenfing] on behalf of [North Carolina's]
using and consuming public" in all decisions affecting the rates and services provided by
public utilities).
239. Cf CAPS Proposal, supra note 224, at 7 (noting that a large RTO region makes it
"particularly difficult for some Advocate Offices to participate directly in PJM meetings").
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smaller districts, there is an opportunity, at least, to give more
2
nuanced attention to the public interest of the local population. 4
Numerous caveats exist, however. State regulation of
transmission planning is often attenuated, as the utility commissioners
indirectly regulate these processes through the integrated regional
planning approach. The utility commissioners themselves are only in
rare cases directly accountable to the electorate, which poses its own
problems. 24 1 Additionally, except for participation in the utility's or
other voluntary transmission planning process, any state regulation
has operated after the utilities or transmission management entities
themselves have crafted their own transmission plans.242 Historically,
neither utility processes nor state planning processes have
emphasized early participation in the planning process by interested
groups. 243 Because such utility-based transmission planning processes
usually do not include a mechanism that provides funding to cover
the costs associated with participation by interested parties, it is
difficult for such parties to make time and spend the resources to
maintain their participation".2 Finally, this narrower utility-based
transmission planning process has, as discussed, permitted a focus on
local issues that may not perfectly align with modernizing an overall
electric transmission grid.
The transmission planning regime that Order 1000 requires
makes some moves in the right direction to mitigate this
representation problem. Order 890 instituted a reform directing that
240. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 586.

241. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part L.A (discussing how projects are often set in stone by the time
public utilities petition state regulators for approval for transmission cost recovery and
siting, leaving scant room for state regulators to exercise their discretion and adjust those
plans based on public interest considerations).
243. See, e.g., N.C. TRANSMISSION PLANNING COLLABORATIVE, supra note 35, at 12
(recognizing the integration of transmission planning into overall integrated resource
planning, the North Carolina state-level transmission planning process explicitly provides
that "[t]he Collaborative Transmission Plan information is available to Participants for
identification of any alternative least cost resources for potential inclusion in their
respective Integrated Resource Plans"). Making the plan "available" to "participants"
would generally not provide sufficient notice or support so that the planning collaborative
would hear alternative viewpoints. See NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., supra
note 207, at 3.
244. Telephone Interview with Gisele Rankin, supranote 99.
245. See FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,856 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (noting that FERC finds that the existing regional transmission
planning processes are not robust enough to necessarily result in a regional transmission
plan that achieves FERC's objectives); REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note

11, at 67.
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public utility transmission providers participating in planning
processes "should" provide cost recovery for state regulators, i.e.
state public utility commissions, to participate in the development of
the transmission plans if the state regulator requested, and this
reform was adopted by Order 1000.2" Under Order 1000, public
utility transmission providers may, if they so desire, include in their
compliance filings a proposed mechanism for other stakeholders to
recover costs associated with this participation,2 47 which provides an
incentive for public utility transmission providers to include a means
of participation in the regional planning processes.
It is unclear exactly what force the "should" directive, as applied
to providing cost recovery for state regulators, will carry. If the public
utility transmission providers come into conflict with the state
regulators, and if regional transmission planning decisions become
more contentious in the future, this ambiguity could prove a
troublesome point of controversy. Moreover, Order 1000 explicitly
leaves the decision of whether to provide funding for non-public
utility commission stakeholders to the public utility transmission
providers themselves. 2' Order 1000 acknowledges the preexisting
"concerns regarding 'how [these groups] will recover the costs
associated with their participation in the planning process.' "249
Parties had raised these concerns in the rulemaking leading up to the
Order 890 regime.250 But Order 1000 states, "We decline to expand
that directive here to include funding for other stakeholder interests,
as requested by certain commenters."2 5' By leaving cost recovery of
participation for parties other than public utility transmission
providers and perhaps state public utility commissions at the
discretion of the public utility transmission providers themselves,
Order 1000 presents a misalignment of incentives, if not a conflict of
interest for the public utility transmission providers.
The need for public interest representation after Order 1000 is
likely accentuated because these new regional planning processes
appear even more amorphous than the imperfect and indirect state
regulation of individual utility planning or the RTO structure which
246. See FERC Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,338 n.339 (Mar. 15, 2007)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37). Scott Hempling has questioned the statutory basis for
allowing the recovery of costs of participation in the transmission planning process. See
NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., supra note 207, at 8.
247. FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,870.
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting FERC Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,338-39).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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concerned Dworkin and Goldwasser. Unlike what is at least indirect
accountability of state-monitored utility transmission and integrated
resource planning processes, or even the RTO structure, the regional
planning processes are embodied and approved by FERC in a public
25 2
utility transmission provider's FERC tariff and compliance filing.
FERC itself does not participate or engage in meeting-to-meeting
monitoring of each regional stakeholder process, and it does not
currently have the resources to do so. Additionally, no natural
constituency necessarily exists to advocate for any particular process
or for the staying power of the process before FERC.
Although less-sophisticated public interest groups may find
themselves afloat in the uncertainty of the new planning processes,
the entities with sophisticated "navigational instruments" for the
newly turbulent regulatory sea may not feel as overwhelmed. These
market participants include public utilities, trade associations,
merchant power providers, and others with more resources to invest
in these planning processes. Given the utilities' and merchant
providers' responsibility to shareholders,25 3 and trade associations'
responsibility to members, these entities should be active in the new
planning processes, and some of these parties' positions are arguably
protective of their consumers and in the public interest, at least in the
short term. 25 4 But these entities' participation alone may not
represent the entirety of the public interest.255 Furthermore, the
current environment may not offer public interest participants the
opportunity to constructively offer their views, which causes problems
later in the permitting process.
The inherent discrepancy in capabilities to influence the planning
process between groups can cause problems-such as choosing suboptimal projects-down the road. A public utility transmission
provider might secure approval for construction of transmission lines
in the regional planning process and present the state utility
252. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 587-88 (noting that "there is no
elected or appointed representative at the regional level to regulate RTO decisions").
Approval in a FERC tariff means that the transmission planning process is subject to
change as simply as filing a request with FERC and securing FERC approval.
253. See ToMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 2, at 174.
254. For example, the utility members of the Coalition for Fair Transmission oppose
FERC Order 1000 in part because they fear that they (and their customers) will be forced
to pay for long-distance transmission lines, constructed by others, to reach faraway utilityscale renewables. See Coalition for Fair Transmission, supra note 6, at 5. However, this
position may be exactly the barrier to expanding transmission that FERC seeks to remove.
255. This explains the regulatory requirement on public utility transmission providers
to offer just and reasonable rates.
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commissions with a transmission plan for cost recovery. The problem
for the public utility transmission provider is when citizen suits,
political pressure, and acrimony spring up around a project. For
public utility transmission providers, this basket of undesirable
outcomes can: (1) derail the project; (2) slow the project down
immeasurably; and (3) engender bad blood between the public utility
transmission providers or regulators that is harmful in future
regulatory negotiations. For a public utility transmission provider
engaged in a project that serves the public interest, this lack of
communication and inclusion of groups could cause needless
problems and bad faith. But a public utility transmission provider
could also take action outside of the public interest. It could
conceivably: (1) secure approval for construction of transmission lines
in the regional (or inter-regional) planning process; (2) present the
state utility commissions with a difficult-to-deny request that may
involve passing the costs (both monetary and environmental) of
construction onto the ratepayers of regions where benefits might be
marginal;" and (3) subsidize the transfer of concentrated renewables
or fossil fuels from the utility's home service area in a manner that is
neither efficient nor equitable.2 57 Recall the example in Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, where the utility's transmission
planning process produced a line, connecting only to another utility's
service area, which may have also been helpful for reliability.25 8 This
transmission line may not have been the product of a transmission
planning process where public interest advocates were adequately
consulted, given the Mississippi Supreme Court's overturning of
eminent domain power because the project was not a "public use."259
In this situation, improving the public interest representation problem
can help the public and the region avoid a potentially undesirable
256. Cf Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 111 (Miss. 1984)
(summarizing the public utility transmission working group's meeting minutes where the
public utility determined the need for transmission construction and the transmission line
that would fulfill that need). FERC Order 1000 Cost Allocation Principle 2 forbids a
public utility transmission provider from allocating costs on a non-voluntary basis to those
ratepayers who receive no benefit, see FERC Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,939, but a
proponent can claim benefits of reliability and relieving grid congestion fairly easily, as
shown by MississippiPower & Light Co.

257. See Coalition for Fair Transmission, supra note 6, at 3, 5 (alleging that under
Order 1000, "decision-making in competitive electric markets will be skewed by
transmission cost socialization that requires customers to subsidize transmission for which
they receive no real benefit").
258. See Miss. Power & Light Co., 460 So. 2d at 111 (noting the utility's claims that the
planned line would enhance overall reliability).
259. Id.
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project and may persuade a wayward transmission provider to
reevaluate its priorities sooner in the process.
After regionalization under Order 1000, larger planning
processes could amplify the issues discussed in the preceding
paragraph. As Dworkin and Goldwasser wrote in 2007 about the
faults of the stakeholder process in the context of RTO decisionmaking, "These criticisms highlight our underlying conclusionstakeholder processes fail to fully represent the needs of the public
interest. Outspent, outnumbered, and procedurally encumbered,
representatives of the public interest cannot fairly compete in the
stakeholder process even when the process itself is deemed
equitable." 2 o After Order 1000, the parties that can exercise greater
control in planning have a greater ability to influence major
infrastructure projects and the efficiency and equity of the
modernization of the nation's electric grid.261 Once a plan is decided
at the regional level, it will be the one in the record, and it could be
difficult for the state regulators or other public interest groups
unhappy with this decision to try to jump-start an alternative.
Thus, the quandary: Although this action by FERC to create a
new required planning process potentially may help secure more just
and reasonable rates overall, consumers, local renewables interests,
landowners, and public interest groups may not have the expertise or
resources to ensure that the best comprehensive plan is chosen. 262 A
mechanism to support public participation could ameliorate the
weaknesses of these stakeholder processes, which could produce a
more equitable and efficient grid modernization outcome.
B. A Policy Proposalto Ameliorate the PublicInterest
Representation Problem
There are benefits to a regional transmission plan that matches
the larger geographic scope of our electric power markets. But if
regional planning is here to stay, our country can improve overall grid
modernization outcomes by providing a public interest representation
mechanism more robust than FERC Order 1000 currently articulates.
Public interest representation before FERC has been an area of
concern for several decades. For example, PURPA amended the FPA
in 1978 to create an Office of Public Participation at FERC to, among
260. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 586.
261. See supra Part II.
262. Cf Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 584 (noting the same problem with
RTO planning and stakeholder groups).
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other duties, "coordinate assistance available to persons intervening
or participating" before FERC.6 Congress never funded this
office.2" Dworkin and Goldwasser proposed reforms to respond
specifically to the public interest representation problems in the
context of RTO stakeholder processes in 2007.265 First, they discussed
"regionalizing state oversight" through the use of Regional State
Committees. 2 66 The authors noted that such committees had been
formed for many RTOs and suggested that proponents of such
committees believe that the committees can represent a "consensus
view from states in the area." 267 But Dworkin and Goldwasser also
noted that Regional State Committees can suffer from funding that is
inadequate compared to the amount of funding available to market
participants and from an institutional structure that makes agreement
between the states difficult."'6 Agreement between the states can be
particularly difficult given the propensity for the states to disagree
with each other on transmission planning and cost allocation issues. 69
And in any case, the Regional State Committees are made up of
utility commissioners or other representatives of a state's governor,
not the public interest groups that encounter the most trouble
participating meaningfully.2 70
The authors also propose (1) regionalizing utility and
transmission regulation, (2) greater FERC enforcement, and (3) state

263. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 212, 92 Stat.
3117, 3148 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 825q-1(b)(1) (2006)).
264. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act 2009: Hearingon S. 1733 Before the
S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1733]
(testimony of Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, FERC).
265. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 588.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 589 (quoting Clinton A. Vince et al., What is Happening and Where in the
World of RTOs and ISOs?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 267,267 (2007)).
268. Id. at 590-91.
269. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2009)
(illustrating the frequency with which states feud over regional cost allocation schemes).
The Order 1000 proceedings show the differences between states on the regional planning
issue.
270. See, e.g., Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 588-91 (noting that Regional
State Committees can have many forms, but giving an example of a Regional State
Committee with representatives appointed by the governor of each member state);
Regional State Committee, SOUTHWEST POWER POOL, http://www.spp.org/committee
_detail.asp?comm1D=35 (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) (showing that RTO Southwest Power
Pool's regional state committee is made up of state utility commissioners). Dworkin and
Goldwasser's summary makes it clear that these committees are to represent the interests
of the states, see Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 58&-89, which can be different
than the public interest parties discussed in this paper.
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action. 27' An overall regionalization of utility and transmission
regulation might raise constitutional issues, and by inspiring the
states' displeasure due to the removal of their authority, might cause
more regulatory problems than solutions. Greater FERC
enforcement is a possibility, but unless it were independent of FERC
and its policy agenda, it could not serve as a viable solution to what
should be a ground-up regional planning process.
As part of their state action proposal, Dworkin and Goldwasser
describe a "regional public advocate program within the stakeholder
process," where what they call "Regional Public Advocates" would
monitor the public's interest in the regional process.2 72 Unlike state
advocates that monitor regional processes, these Regional Public
Advocates would not have to "juggle both in-state and regional
responsibilities."2 7 3 The authors suggest that one option would be for
the states themselves to create a joint regional representative,
answerable jointly to the states, to guard the public interest. 7 4 One
challenge for the Regional Public Advocate proposal is that these
entities "would have to answer to some cumulative state-based
authority," although as the authors note "it is unclear who this might
be." 275 The authors suggest the Regional Public Advocate should
report to whoever has the role of representing the public interest in
each of the members' states, but then note the danger of the Regional
Public Advocate's independence being compromised because of
tensions between individual states and the Regional Public

Advocate.27 6
Other worthy models have been proposed more recently. For
example, the Waxman-Markey Climate Change Bill that passed the
House of Representatives in 2009 included a provision creating a
federal Office of Consumer Advocate at FERC. 277 This office, besides
having power to investigate rates, would have had the power to
"develop means, such as public dissemination of information,
consultative services, and technical assistance, to ensure, to the
maximum extent practicable, that the interests of energy consumers

271. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 592-95.
272. Id. at 595.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 596.
277. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Climate
Change Bill), H.R, 2454, 111th Cong. § 194 (2009); see also Clean Energy Jobs and
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 151 (2009) (providing for a similar office).
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are adequately represented" in ratemaking matters.278 Although the
bill did not define "energy consumer," it did define "energy
customer" to be limited to "residential or small commercial
customer" who receives electric service from a utility company.279
Congressman Jim Gerlach and former Congressman Joe Sestak
proposed similar legislation in the past, including a version to create
such an office within the U.S. Department of Justice. 21 They also
proposed a law that would require FERC to hold a public hearing
before issuing any permit." And the National Consumer Law Center
has proposed the creation of a nearly identical office within the
Department of Energy.282 California has an innovative solution: it
provides intervener funding to firms participating on behalf of the
public interest in state commission proceedings.2 83 Such a plan could
be adapted to the regional planning process of Order 1000.
The most recent reform was proposed in late 2012 by several
RTOs that secured disgorgement in the market manipulation
settlement between Constellation Energy Group and the FERC
Office of Enforcement, and this reform proposal has been approved
by FERC.M It is very similar to the Regional Public Advocate
proposed in 2007 by Dworkin and Goldwasser. 285 RTOs PJM and
NYISO requested that FERC approve the allocation of part of the
settlement to fund a Consumer Advocate of PJM States and a

278. H.R. 2454 § 194(a)(3)(D).
279. Id. § 198.
280. Anne Pickering, Daily Local: Lawmakers Discuss New FERC Legislation,
CONGRESSMAN
JiM GERLACH (Apr. 17, 2009), http://gerlach.house.gov/news
/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=123981. Representative Gerlach reintroduced a bill
in 2011, but the proposal focused on the permitting process and non-specifically treated
the range or limits of powers in his proposed Office of Consumer Advocate. See Bill
Summary & Status, H.R. 1921, 111th Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c112:H.R.1696.IH: (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). The bill never attracted cosponsors, and ultimately died in House committee. See Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 1696,
112th Cong., THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.01696: (last visited
Feb. 21, 2013).
281. See Pickering,supra note 280.
282. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.nclc.org
limages/pdf/speciaLprojects/climate change/recommendations-for-low-income.pdf
(recommending provision of funds for FERC proceedings).
283. See Tyson Slocum, Consumer Advocate Position Needed at Top Energy Regulator,
ENERGYVOX (May 16, 2011), http://www.energyvox.org/2011/05/16/consumer-advocateposition-needed-at-top-energy-regulator/.
284. See Larry Rulison, State to Get $78M of Energy Utility's Fine, ALBANY TIMES
UNION (Oct. 29, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/business/article/State-to-get78M-of-energy-utility-s-fine-3991620.php.
285. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
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NYISO Consumer Advocate? These reforms will pay for the hiring
of a small amount of staff to create a non-profit in support the
advocacy of retail ratepayers in market design issues to discourage
market manipulation. 2' But the proposals also explain that they will
support greater representation of retail consumers in the regional
transmission expansion process.2 8 This reform is notable because
there is real, dedicated regional funding for an advocate on behalf of
a public interest-the retail ratepayers. Besides the issues with interstate conflict, independence, and accountability that Dworkin and
Goldwasser noted above,m8 a disadvantage of this proposal is that the
funding comes from a onetime source-the disgorgement-and it
may not be sufficient to continue the advocacy process in the longer
term. 29 0 Also, such a funding level is almost certainly markedly below
that of many market participants, and the technical and legal analyses
necessary to come to an independent evaluation of the transmission
planning and market design issues are costly.29 ' Additionally, interests
besides those of retail ratepayers, such as some economic
development or renewable energy interests, would not necessarily be
represented. At bottom, the reforms to create this new regional
advocate are an exciting development and an indication that the need
for better public interest participation is gaining traction, although
they could be improved.
This Comment proposes an alternative solution based on
Dworkin and Goldwasser's Regional Public Advocate and the very
recent regional advocate reforms in PJM and NYISO. Called a
"Public Staff Model" advocate, this plan would be modeled on the

286. See CAPS Proposal, supra note 224, at 3-4; Rulison, supra note 284.
287. CAPS Proposal, supra note 224, at 2-3 ("The purpose of CAPS is to facilitate and
bolster the representation of retail consumers' interests in PJM stakeholder processes.").
288. Id. at 3 n.7 ("Stakeholder processes are also used to develop transmission
expansion planning rules to address reliability, economic and policy goals, develop regionwide load forecasts and determine how to best integrate demand side resources such as
demand response and energy efficiency.").
289. See supra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
290. The CAPS Proposal's budget is $350,000 annually, which proponents claim would
"attract and retain an executive director at the superior talent level required to represent
consumer interests in complex, multi-disciplinary PJM proceedings." CAPS Proposal,
supra note 224, at 4.
291. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 23, at 590-91 (explaining that the
proposed New England Regional State Committee annual budget of $1.4 million for the
first two years and $2.2 million for the following three was much lower than market
participants' expenditures and might not be sufficient to pay for legal and technical
analysis).
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structure of a state consumer advocate,' but would be a party
standing separate from the state commissions, utilities, or FERC. It
would be invested with some of the powers of the state consumer
advocates. 93 Specifically, it would have the powers to: (1) intervene in
the transmission planning process representing the public interest; (2)
obtain information for the public from the transmission planning
process, and perhaps from the utilities making up the transmission
planning process; and (3) invite members of the public to address and
question the stakeholders engaged in transmission planning. 294 The
advocate would maintain a website with clearly accessible
information, as well as a phone number where interested parties
could call and receive information about the business of the regional
transmission planning process. This proposal would be consistent with
FERC Order 1000's requirement of the regional planning process.2 5
Although adoption of a Regional Public Advocate or Office of
Consumer Advocate would improve the amount of information
available about the regional planning process, the Public Staff Model
might function in a superior manner in important respects. One
important way that the Public Staff Model would improve upon the
Regional Public Advocate and at the same time address the obscure,
technical character of transmission planning is by independently
providing important information to any party, including the press and
the interest groups that might have incentives to monitor transmission
planning. Emphasizing the extra step of improving accountability to
affected non-state public interest parties is important because the
other proposals limit the reach and discretion of advocates. State
utility commissions must balance between what this Comment defines
as public interest and shareholder concerns. State public advocates
only advocate through their statutorily created powers and only look
for retail ratepayer interests, sometimes including large ratepayers
whose interests are opposed to smaller parties in important respects.
The Public Staff Model discussed here refines the idea of the
Office of Consumer Advocate in FERC by specifically acknowledging
292. There are several models of the state consumer advocate. Consumer advocates
can be located in the Attorney General's Office, usually as part of a consumer protection
section, they can be a separate office unto themselves, or they can be an independent
office within the state utilities commission. See The History of NASUCA, NAT'L ASS'N
OF ST. UTIL. CONSUMER ADVOCS., http://www.nasuca.org/archive/about/index.php (last
visited Feb. 21, 2013).
293. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-15 (2011) (detailing the structure, authority, and
duties of the North Carolina Utilities Commission's Public Staff model).
294. Id.
295. See supra Part III.A.
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the transmission planning process's inherent consideration of broader
energy policy issues. These pre-Order 1000 Office of Consumer
Advocate proposals tend to define consumers in a way that limits
representation to pure consumer protection issues within a narrower
definition of rates and practices.2 96 This focus may not acknowledge
the more multifaceted public interests that this Comment argues
should be factored into transmission planning decisions. Order 1000
also reinforces the importance of early involvement with transmission
planning, which heavily influences cost allocation, includes
discussions of state public policy priorities, and generally is where
parties need to be involved if they are to maximize consideration of
public interest objectives and generate the most equitable and
efficient transmission plan.
By dispensing information to those parties interested in
safeguarding the public interest in the earliest stages of transmission
planning, the Public Staff Model advocate would enable public
interest parties to have a say, and to contribute to improving the
overall plan, before concrete transmission planning proposals emerge
out of the process and become difficult to undo. Likewise, although
the proposed Office of Consumer Advocate included in the WaxmanMarkey Bill and associated proposals contain important aspects of a
successful reform, the promulgation of Order 1000 should refocus
reforms on transmission planning, cost allocation, public policy
priorities, and other aspects of Order 1000.297 For this reason, the
California intervener plan as instituted will likely not serve as well in
transmission planning processes as in its current application in agency
proceedings because of their spaced-out yet continuous planning
meetings.
296. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
297. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Climate
Change Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 198 (2009).
298. See Slocum, supra note 283; cf NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. ET AL., supra note
282. One issue with providing dedicated funding to public interest groups in the FERC
Order 1000 transmission planning context is that these ongoing processes would
effectively create a government-funded, quasi-permanent set of interest groups. In
addition to the questions of use of resources for a permanent but non-governmental
group, questions of the group's independence from their funding source could be more
problematic than an independent government advocate and permanent third-party
appropriations to watchdogs are likely to be viewed with suspicion and be frequent targets
for elimination from appropriations. On the other hand, as the National Consumer Law
Center points out, ratepayers fund public utilities and utility commissions' participation in
these types of processes, so it is reasonable to fund third-party interest groups. Given the
drawbacks discussed above, however, this Comment takes the position that the Public
Staff Model's combination of intervention on behalf of the public interest and facilitation
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For a Public Staff Model reform to function effectively, it would
have to be funded, staffed, and institutionally located in a way that
would maximize its efficiency and minimize its political capture.
Unlike the Regional Public Advocate proposal, funding by the states
would not serve the purpose completely because states could attempt
to curtail release to the public and other states. Staffing would also
need to be independent of FERC's transmission-construction
agenda, 299 but this problem exists at the White House level and at the
Department of Energy as well.
To remedy these problems, each planning process or group of
planning processes, depending upon need, could have Public Staff
Model advocates located geographically proximate to a planning
process or several processes. The staff could be institutionally housed
within a newly created separate FERC Office, an Office of Consumer
Advocate, who would be separate from FERC in the manner of the
current FERC Office of Administrative Litigation. The Office of
Consumer Advocate would provide institutional support to the Public
Staff Model advocates around the country in front of FERC and
other federal government agencies, which would be necessary for
these public advocates to avoid being brushed off in the world of
agency politics. The Office of Consumer Advocate could choose the
various advocates in consultation with both the state public utility
commissions and state consumer advocates. The Consumer Advocate
himself would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, so he would not be beholden to the FERC Commissioners in
making the appointments of the Public Staff Model advocates. The
confirmation by the Senate, a body made up of people representing
all the states, should help to guard against a geographically biased
Consumer Advocate that would favor one region's priorities over
another region. And because the Consumer Advocate's role would be
to merely appoint the staff around the country in consultation with
other groups, the risk of a Consumer Advocate's bias would also be
reduced.
Another option is to make the appointer of the Public Staff
Model advocates a "chief information advocate" within the Energy
Information Administration, an independent part of the Department
of access to information for third party advocacy groups, discussed infra, would be
preferable.
299. See Hearing on S. 1733, supra note 264, at 8-9 (testimony of Jon Wellinghoff,
Chairman, FERC) (recommending approval of the bill, which included an Office of
Consumer Advocacy (OCA), and stating that "jt]o ensure its independence from FERC,
OCA should be placed within another agency or created as a separate agency").
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of Energy ("DOE"). This would provide greater focus on the
information-gathering and dispensing side of the Public Staff Model
Advocate, but the Energy Information Administration's technical and
technocratic focus might make it an imperfect home for an office that
could incur the wrath of FERC Commissioners and powerful public
utility interests.
Given that creation of the Public Staff Model advocate could
incur such displeasure, one criticism is that congressional action of
this type is extremely difficult to achieve. Congressional action is
already elusive in the energy policy area, and likely FERC, DOE, and
administration opposition on one side and certain states, state
consumer advocates, and consumer-oriented nonprofits on the other
make the political odds of creation poor. As to the criticism that
FERC will resist this encroachment on its authority, it is
understandably difficult to imagine FERC commissioners agreeing to
any additional limits on what they see as their central authority over
transmission in interstate commerce. But FERC commissioners, and
the agency as a whole, are motivated by the public interest, and they
might be open to a narrowly designed reform that may spread the
benefits of transmission more equitably and lead to better decisionmaking, while still preserving the coordination and openness that
FERC embraced in Order 890 and Order 1000.30
Such a reform would thus almost certainly have to come from
Congress. Fortunately, as discussed, these types of reforms have been
proposed and included in serious legislation such as the 2009 climate
change bills.301 Many congressmen vigilantly guard the prerogative of
their states in public utility regulation under the federalist system,
and as state utility commissions have offices of people's counsel,
congressional leaders interested in ensuring equitable, efficient
300. See FERC 987th Commission Meeting, at 36 (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.fere.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20121123092051-transcript.pdf (Comments of
Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, FERC) ("I also want to comment on one item of the
disgorgement of some of the [Constellation Energy Settlement] profits that are going to
good use. I found out at the NARUC Convention recently that both New York and PJM
have decided to use part of that money for a consumer advocate representative in PJM
and in New York."); Hearing on S. 1733, supra note 264, at 8-9. Chairman Wellinghoff
cautioned against giving the Office of Consumer Advocacy independent investigatory
authority. Hearing on S. 1733, supra note 264, at 8.
301. See H.R. 2454; Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong.
§ 151 (2009).
302. See The American Energy Initiative: Electric TransmissionIssues, Including Topics
Related to the Siting, Planning, and Allocation of Costs for Electricity Transmission
Infrastructure:Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. passim
(2011).
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public interest
decision-making
with more
transmission
representation can certainly open negotiations with FERC over some
kind of reform to the regional planning process. This Comment
sketches a proposal for that reform, updated in the context of FERC's
promulgation of Order 1000.
There is also the normative issue of fairly sourcing the revenue
that is appropriated to a Public Staff Model advocate. The obvious
answer that it should come from FERC as it is FERC that is
interested in achieving the just and reasonable rates by promoting
wholesale markets is a non-answer because FERC is funded by the
fees and charges from the regulated industry. 03 FERC will pass the
costs to the regulated entities, who themselves could be benefitting
from the lower price of electricity available to be purchased on the
wholesale market. The regulated entities would attempt to pass the
costs on to the ratepayers. In the end, ratepayers should probably
fund this improvement in public interest participation, because the
benefits from more equitable and efficient decision-making
supporting more robust wholesale transmission should flow to
ratepayers. Of course, ensuring that transmission expansion does not
unfairly disadvantage certain parties is part of the basic fairness by
which our culture evaluates political and administrative institutions."*
Funding the Public Staff Model could be achieved through a
regulatory fee assessed on the regulated transmission providers.0 s If
progressive distributional outcomes are especially important to
policymakers, the fee can then be attached to certain FERC tariffs so
that smaller or residential users of electricity are not affected.
This Comment concedes that a Public Staff Model will not undo
the states' loss of exercised jurisdiction over the transmission
planning process, or necessarily enable public interest groups to
change the process's outcome. However, given the likelihood of
sustained greater federal jurisdiction, the Public Staff Model is a
worthy reform to help our nation to maximize the benefits of a

303. About FERC, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/about-ferc.asp ("The
Commission is funded through costs recovered by the fees and annual charges from the
industries it regulates.") (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
304. See Bo Rothstein, PoliticalInstitutions:An Overview, in A NEW HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 135, 138 (Tovert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 1996)
(contending that when evaluating institutions, the normative questions about institutions'
ability to create a just society should be an important motivator in the analysis).
305. This mirrors the funding mechanism that North Carolina uses to pay for the work
of the Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities Commission. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62302 (2011); 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 11.R15-1 (2012).
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modernizing grid while fulfilling the statutory and moral imperative
of protecting the public interest.
CONCLUSION
In order to ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates, FERC
has encouraged the development of competitive wholesale electricity
markets, and these markets have placed higher demands on the
electric grid. Many of the barriers to modernization and capacity
improvement relate to transmission planning processes and
associated cost allocation. In Order 1000, FERC is therefore asserting
additional federal authority over these areas. FERC hopes that this
reform will facilitate reliability, lower rates, and adoption of largescale renewables.
The transmission planning reform aspects of Order 1000 will
likely not be invalidated for exceeding FERC's statutory powers, as it
appears that courts may be willing to read FERC's longstanding
authority over all "transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce" to include authority over the transmission rate portion of
retail sales. Given this eventuality, both FERC and its opponents
have the opportunity to maximize the advantages that Order 1000 can
bring. By improving representation of the public interest in the
transmission planning process our country can promote the goal of a
transmission grid modernized equitably and efficiently. Implementing
a reform like the Public Staff Model proposed in this Comment can
ensure that the benefits of the modern grid better compensate our
nation for those monthly electric bills and other costs. From both an
equity and an efficiency standpoint, improving public interest
representation is the right thing to do.
ALEXANDER
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